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Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price
Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced
Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed
upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part
from Federally Funded Research
Peter S. Arno*
Michael H. Davis
This Article discusses drug pricing in the context offederally funded inventions. It
examines the "march-in" provision of the Bayh-Dole Act, a federal statute that governs
inventions supported in whole or in part by federal funding. It discusses technology-transfer
activity as a whole and the often-conflicting roles of the government, academia, and industry.
The Article discusses the mechanisms of the Bayh-Dole Act and examines its legislative history.
It notes that the Act has had a powerfid price-controlclause since its enactment in 1980 that
mandates that inventions resultingfrom federallyfunded researchmust be sold at reasonable
prices. The Article concludes that the solution to high drug prices does not involve new
legislationbut alreadyexists in the unused,unenforced march-inprovision ofthe Bayh-DoleAct.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is widely believed that advances in drug development and
biomedical technology over the next few decades will revolutionize
the delivery of health care, reduce mortality and morbidity, and
improve the quality of life for individuals afflicted by many lifethreatening conditions.' An apparent nirvana of high technology
seems within reach, and yet the dark shadow of exploitation and a
growing disparity of access lurks, threatening a loss of democratic
control over the necessities of life through corporate domination of
economic and political freedoms. Increasingly, the combined efforts
of government, industry, and academia are advancing free trade in
both domestic and international fora. However, the immediate,
financial fiuits of these achievements appear, for the most part, to
adduce to private participants. The relationships among these players
have an enormous impact on the costs of health care, the health of the
American public, the nation's competitive position in the global
economy, and the integrity, quality, and independence of science. In
light of the controversies, the evolving approach to these publicprivate relationships in health-related research demands scrutiny.2
1.
RuH E. BROWN ET AL., THE VALUE OF PHARMACEUTrcALS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
FUTURE COSTS FOR SELECTED CONDITONS 3 (1991).

2.
It is difficult to call such often one-sided relationships partnerships. Not only is
there little question that the real winners here are private entities, but the government, when
reviewing the results, reports these private gains in what can only be characterized as a
contentedly sanguine manner
Two major beneficiaries of this federal spending have been universities and U.S.based corporations. The universities benefited because the government was
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The failure of the Clinton health plan, the apparently growing
domination of medical care by what are effectively legally immune
health maintenance organizations (H-IMOs), and the stranglehold over
pharmaceuticals by the drug industry have led to feelings of
frustration, impatience, and anger over unmanageable and
unaffordable health care in the United States.4 Complaints about the
high cost of medical care have settled, to a substantial extent, on the
costs of pharmaceuticals, which have grown faster than other

components of health care in recent years.

Even the medical

establishment, long a conservative force, has begun to ask why drug
prices are so high' and why there is no way to regulate them, as is
done in so many foreign countries.6 Many drugs, of course, are
produced through joint public and private efforts, and though it would
seem logical to use this as a leverage point to regulate drug prices,7 the
critics remain so silent on that point that it seems almost
conspiratorial.8
In fact, as this Article will show, a leverage point is available
through an existing statutory remedy in the Bayh-Dole Act.
willing to underwrite basic research that may not lead to the creation of new and
profitable products or services in the near term. The corporations benefited from
the products and services they were able to develop for the government itself as
well as from the "spin-off" process, whereby the results of government-sponsored
research could be used to develop products and services for the private sector.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, GAO/RCED-98-06, TECHNOLOGY TRANSF'ER:
ADMINISTRATION OF Tm BAYH-DOLE AcT BY REsEA-cH UnERsTES 2 (1998) [hereinafter
AmmNIST ,TON OF THE BAvH-DoL Acr].
3.
See Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2147 (2000); N.Y. State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-62, 668 (1995). In
Pegram, the United States Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's holding that ERISA
preempted claims against an HMO and that the HMO could not be sued under ERISA for
breach of fiduciary duty. Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2158.
4.
See Alan M. Garber & Paul M. Romer, Evaluatingthe FederalRole in Financing
Health-RelatedResearch, 93 PRoc. NAT'LACAD. Sci. 12,717, 12,717-24 (1996).
5.
See Marcia Angell, The PharmaceuticalIndustry-To Whom Is ltAccountable?,
342 NEV ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1902-04 (2000).
6.
Lucette Lagnado et al., Dose ofReality, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1999, at Al; Drug
Pricing:PoorPrescriptionfor Consumers and Taxpayers? HearingBeforethe S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 11-14, 65-70 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Drug Pricing
Hearing] (testimony and statement of Peter Amo, Ph.D., Assoc. Professor, Albert Einstein
Coll. of Med.).
7.
See 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-212 (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).
8.
In the area of health care, there is some historical reason to resist labeling
conspiracy theories as mere paranoia. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 128 n.4
(1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that doctors are reluctant to inform patients that
previous treatments provided by other doctors were performed negligently); Richard M.
Markus, ConspiracyofSilence, 14 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REv. 520, 521-22 (1965) (discussing
the "conspiracy of silence" that exists in medical malpractice cases, caused by medical
professionals' unwillingness to testify against one another).
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Traditionally, there has been little explicit articulation of industrial
policy in the United States. However, an increasing climate of
globalization and a competitive international marketplace have led
many policy makers (including those in recent administrations) to
support greater planning and collaboration between the public and
private sectors.9 This Article explores the recent evolution of policies
designed to transfer technology between the public and private
sectors-although it is more accurate to say that they are, for the most
part, transfers from the public to the private sector-and the
appropriate means by which to do so. One fundamental thematic
question that runs throughout this Article is, do American taxpayers,
who fund a substantial portion of health-related research and
development (R&D), receive a fair return on their investment? In a
capitalist economy, it is remarkable that, to speak of public taxpayer
returns on health-related R&D, one must limit the discussion to
nonmonetary returns because the taxpayers seldom, if ever, see a
financial return. ' °
The purported goal of the public-private relationships discussed
is to serve the public interest by developing and commercializing
inventions made with federal funding through the transfer of
technology, resources, personnel, and expertise among federal
government agencies, industry, and academia. Some have argued that
the public interest is best served by aggressive efforts to encourage
industry to commercialize products developed by academic or
government scientists."1 They point to the benefits of effective new
therapies, the creation of new jobs, and the enhancement of private
9.

The "partnership" between the Clinton administration and private industry had

become so great-in the areas of (1) the first Clinton administration's health plan; (2) the
greater globalization marked by NAFTA, GAIT, and the entry of China into the WTO; and
(3) the use of national statutory trade policies to assist private industry-that some have

called the administration a"traitor" to the traditional goals of the Democratic party. Walter
A. McDougall, Tale of Two Presidents,N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2000, at A30 (letter to the

editor) ("Mr. Clinton has likewise served to consolidate the Reagan revolution by balancing
the budget, reforming welfare and unleashing the private sector. That explains.., why much

of the American left considers Mr. Clinton a traitor.").
10. The federal government receives less than a 1%return in royalties on government
inventions. See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
11. Indeed, commercialization of products developed by academic or government
scientists is the purported justification for the Bayh-Dole Act-at least insofar as it adopted a
"title," as opposed to a "licensing," approach to government-developed patents-and the
legislative history is replete with claims that granting title, as opposed to a mere license, to
federal contractors would speed and enhance technological progress. Government Patent
Policy: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. of the House Comm. on
Sci. & Tech., 96th Cong. 4-5 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 GovernmentPatentPolicy Hearings]

(statement of Hon. Harrison H. Schnitt, U.S. Senator, N.M.); S. Rn,. No. 96-480, at 16,2730(1979).
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industry. The critics of this view believe that industry is not
sufficiently accountable for its use of publicly funded resources and
that the taxpayer's return on investment has been inadequate." To
support this argument, these critics cite the high price of goods that are
supported by government funds through direct grants, licensing
arrangements, corporate tax credits, and allowances.' 3 They also argue
that R&D subsidies distort investment and consumption incentives and
introduce interest group pressures that can obscure market signals.'4
The premise of this Article is that these public-private
relationships all too frequently rest on untested and unsupported
assumptions and that even accepting those assumptions on faith, the
mechanisms established to police these public-private relationships
have been either ignored or misunderstood.' 5 However, some claim
that without them, the results of some meritorious publicly funded and

12. Witness the recent Sanders Amendment to the House appropriations bill, which
required that federally funded inventions be subject to reasonable pricing requirements-or,
more accurately, insisted that march-in rights created by the Bayh-Dole Act be enforced to
assure the reasonable pricing of such drugs. 146 CONG. REc. H4231 (daily ed. June 13,
2000) (statement of Rep. Sanders). The text of the Sanders Amendment is as follows:
None of the funds made available in this Act for the Department of Health and
Human Services may be used to grant an exclusive or partially exclusive license
pursuant to chapter 18 of title 35, United States Code, except in accordance with
section 209 of such title (relating to the availability to the public of an invention
and its benefits on reasonable terms).
Id.
13. See Health CareReform: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Health & the Env't
of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 103d Cong. 591-96 (1994) (testimony of
Abbey S. Meyers, President, Nat'l Org. for Rare Disorders); James P. Love, The OtherDrug
War: How Industry ExploitsPharm Subsidies,AMEmCAN PROSPECr, Summer 1993, at 121,
121-22; Linda Marsa, UnhealthyAlliances, OMNI, Feb. 1994, at 36,38-42.

14.

U.S.

OFFICE OF TECH.

ASSESSMENT,

MULTINATIONALS

AND

THE U.S.

TECHNOLOGY BASE: FINAL REPORT OF THE MULTINATIONALS PROJECr 12 (1994).

15.

A recent federal report on the administration of the Bayh-Dole Act reveals that

there have been no enforcement actions and states:

Federal agencies' administration of the Bayh-Dole Act as it applies to research
universities is decentralized.

While the Department of Commerce has issued

implementing regulations and provides coordination under limited circumstances,
the act actually is administered by the agencies providing the funds. The agencies'
activities consist largely of ensuring that the universities meet the reporting
requirements and deadlines set out in the act and regulations. According to
Commerce officials, no agency has yet taken back the title to any inventions
because they were not being commercialized.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DoLE Acr, supranote 2, at 1-2; see also infra notes 294-313
and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the NIH to apply the appropriate criteria for
government march-in rights to the CellPro litigation).
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conducted research would remain unavailable to the public.'6
Nonetheless, this Article asserts that the delicate mechanisms
established to ensure that the fruits of these public investments are not
abused have gone unnoticed or, worse, have been concealed.17
11.

HEALTH-RELATED FEDERAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The U.S. government plays a key role in various stages of healthrelated R&D. Along with conducting and funding research, its
support of educational institutions and training of young scientists
have fostered and developed the world's premier biomedical
infrastructure. Government-funded basic research has been largely
responsible for the emergence and growth of the biotechnology
industry. 8 The funding goes beyond basic research, of course; if it did
not, it would not yield so many patentable inventions, because patents
are not available for pure research, but only for those applications of
basic research that have reached the level of concrete and
demonstrable utility. 9 However, industry habitually claims sole credit
for actual commercialization."
Notwithstanding these claims, the government's funding of
health-related R&D is, in fact, substantial. In 1995, the last year that
the government collected and published data on public expenditures
for health-related R&D, these expenditures reached $15.8 billion and
represented 44% of the nation's total spending on such R&D.2 ' In
contrast, industry's contribution to health-related R&D in that year was
16.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-95-52, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS:

BENEFIrS OF COoPERATIv R&D AGREeMENrs 9-10 (1994) (providing an example of how a
public-private research endeavor benefited children born with birth defects).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 294-315 (analyzing the CeliProlitigation).
18. See LYNNE G. ZuCKER Er AL., INTELLECrUAL CAPrrAL AND THE BIRTH OF U.S.
BIOTECHNOLOGY ENTERPRISES 20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.

4653, 1994).
19. Nothing can be patented unless it first satisfies, among other elements, the
demonstrable utility requirement of the Patent Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
20. See Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, DrugMakers Reap Profitson Tax-Backed
Research,N.Y. Trams, Apr. 23,2000, at Al; Peter G. Gosselin &Paul Jacobs, DNA Device's
HeredityScrutinized by US., L.A. TmES, May 14,2000, at Al.
21. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS FOR HEALTH R&D, BY
SOURCE OR PERFORMER: FISCAL YEARs 1985-1999, availableat http://silk.nih.gov/public
cbz2zoz.@www.awards.sourfund.htm (last modified Nov. 30, 1999) [hereinafter NIH
FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS]. It should be noted that there have been no figures published since
1995, the last year that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) collected this data. It may
seem astonishing, or merely suspicious, but no government agency has maintained these
statistics since that date. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, ESTmATES OF NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR
HEALTH R&D BY SOURCE OR PERFORmER, FY 1986-1995, available at
http://grants.nih.gov/grantslawardltrends96/pdfdocs/FEDTABLA.PDF.
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$18.6 billion, or 52% of the nation's total.' By projecting public and
private R&D expenditures from 1986 through 1995, total national

spending on health-related R&D in 1999 was an estimated $45.5
billion: $19.2 billion contributed by government (42% of the total),
$24.8 billion contributed by industry (55% of the total), and the

balance funded by private nonprofit sources (3% of the total).'
However, these figures on health-related R&D exclude the
phenomenally valuable tax credits and deductions that effectively
constitute a public investment in these private enterprises.24 Moreover,
the shift to managed care has increased pressures to augment public

funding and thus tip the balance even more toward public investment
without any clear policing mechanisms.'
Because its taxes pay for them, the public has certain claims or
rights, both moral and legal, to government-funded inventions. Public
funding through the National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the most
obvious and direct source of taxpayer support for health-related

22. NIH FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 21.
23. We chose to use a linear extrapolation based on historical data to estimate
expenditures for 1999 because the government stopped collecting comprehensive data in
1995. This seems to be a more reasonable approach than using either industry-generated data
or estimates of specific sectors by the NIH. The NIH's most recent estimate of total federal
spending on health-related R&D in 1999 is $17.2 billion. See NIH FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS,
supranote 21. However, these figures do not include state and local government spending,
which, in 1995, totaled $2.4 billion. The pharmaceutical industry's own estimate of its R&D
for 1999 is $24 billion. See PHARM. REsEARCH & MFRS. OF AM. (PARMA), TH
PHARmAcEurICAL ImusTRY's R&D INVESTMENT, available at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/backgrounders/development/invest.phtml (last updated Feb. 1,2000).
24. Memorandum from Gary Guenther, Analyst in Business Taxation and Finance, to
Joint Economic Committee 1-7 (Dec. 13, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Guenther
Memorandum] (finding that "net income in the drug industry was taxed relatively lightly
between 1990 and 1996" and "that the drug industry realized significant tax savings from five
tax provisions: the foreign tax credit, the possessions tax credit, the research and
experimentation tax credit, the orphan drug tax credit, and the expensing of research
expenditures").
25. One commentator described this phenomenon, highlighting the potential
drawbacks of the shift to managed care:
At the same time, a third force-the move toward managed care in the delivery of
health care services-pushes in the other direction. This change in the market for
health care services is desirable on many grounds, but to the extent that it reduces
utilization of some medical technologies, it will have the undesirable side effect of
diminishing private sector incentives to conduct research leading to innovations in
health care. Everything else equal, this change calls for increased public support
for biomedical research. In the near term, the best policy response may therefore
be one that combines expanded government support for research in some areas
with stronger property rights and a shift toward more reliance on the private sector
in other areas.
Garber & Romer, supranote 4, at 12,724.
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R&D. 26 However, tax deductions and tax credits taken by
pharmaceutical corporations are another major indirect source of
taxpayer support for health-related R&D.
Since 1954, the tax code has encouraged all U.S. taxpaying firms
to invest in R&D by allowing them to deduct R&D expenditures from
their taxable income.2 7 In addition to tax deductions, firms receive a
variety of tax credits for increasing research expenses.28 Tax credits
that companies receive under section 936 of the Internal Revenue
Code for manufacturing products in Puerto Rico constitute one of the
most substantial tax subsidies to the pharmaceutical industry.29 The
pharmaceutical industry has received approximately half of the total
tax benefits from section 936.0 From 1980 through 1990, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that twenty-six pharmaceutical
companies had tax savings of $10.1 billion from Puerto Rico
operations and that these tax savings translated into $24.7 billion
(1990 dollars) in tax-exempt earnings. 3' What is more surprising is
that the tax benefits received by pharmaceutical firms were nearly
three times the compensation paid to their employees, an odd finding
given the fact that when Congress enacted section 936 in 1976 it
sought to help Puerto Rico obtain employment-generating
investments. 2 Partially in response to the windfall savings received
by the pharmaceutical industry, section33 936 tax benefits were to be
reduced and then eventually phased out.
In addition to the possessions, or Puerto Rico, tax credit, the
pharmaceutical industry has realized significant tax savings from at
least three other tax provisions: the foreign tax credit, the orphan drug

26.

The NIH is the lead public agency supporting health-related R&D; it funds more

than 80% of all federal government spending in this area. See NIH
supra note 21.

27.
28.

FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS,

I.R.C. § 174 (1994).

See U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS
AND RE ARDS 183-99 (1993).

29.
30.
INDUSTRY:
31.
32.

I.R.C. § 936 (Supp. IV 1998).
U.S. GEN. AccouNTiNG OFFCE, GAO/GGD-92-72BR,
TAx BENEFrsT OF OPERATwG INPUERTO RICO 4 (1992).
Id. at 5.
See id. at 1, 4.

PHARMACEUTICAL

33. One expert summarized the impact of section 936 as follows:
The possessions credit, which is being phased out under the Small Business Job
Protection Act of 1996, encouraged drug firms to establish a significant
manufacturing presence in Puerto Rico and other U.S. territorial possessions by
giving a tax credit equal to the entire amount of federal income tax liability on
possessions-source income.
Guenther Memorandum, supranote 24, at 6.
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tax credit, and the general business tax credit.34 These tax provisions
not only provide a significant public subsidy to the pharmaceutical
industry, but they also help it maintain one of the lowest effective tax
35
rates and one of the highest after-tax profit rates of any industry.
Between 1990 and 1996, these four tax provisions generated savings
of $27.9 billion for the pharmaceutical industry; specifically, it saved
$4.5 billion in 1996.36 The provisions do not distinguish between
short-term, bottom-line investments and longer-term, riskier
investments that may yield products fifteen or twenty years later.37
Nor are the provisions associated with any requirement that the tax
credit be used for R&D, rather than for administration or marketing
expenses.
For the pharmaceutical industry, administration or
marketing expenses overshadow purported R&D expenses by a factor
of three.3" Moreover, there are claims that the pharmaceutical industry
inflates9 its R&D expenses by including administration and marketing
3
costs.

The vast public resources devoted to health-related research
through direct government funding or indirectly through the tax code
underscore the importance of determining whether adequate benefits
are accruing to the American public. In the entire ten-year period from
1985 through 1994, the NIH received slightly under $76 million in
royalties, including $40 million from just one license, the HIV
antibody test kit.4° This represents less than 1% of the NIH's
intramural funding during this time period. During the next sevenyear period, from 1993 through 1999, total royalties were almost $200
million, reaching an annual peak in 1999 of almost $45 million, which
34. Id.
35. See id. at 2-5.
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. Is Today's Science Policy PreparingUs for the Future? Hearing Before the
House Comm. on Sci., 104th Cong. 36 (1995) (testimony of Hon. Ronald H. Brown, Sec'y,
Dep't of Commerce) ("However, the R&E tax credit does not differentiate between
investments directed toward short-term product delivery and longer term, higher risk
investments that will yield products fifteen or twenty years into the future.").
38. A Brave New World, MEDADNavs, Sept. 1999, at 3, 6-10.
39. As one commentator explained:
The marketing budgets of the drug industry are enormous-much larger than the
research and development costs--although exact figures are difficult to come by,
in part because marketing and administrative expenses are often folded together
and in part because some of the research and development budget is for marketing
research.
Angell, supranote 5, at 1903.
40. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AcrvrrmEs FY1993FY1999, available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/newpagesfwebstats99.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2001).
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is more than triple the 1993 amount.4 ' The royalties still represent,
however, less than 1%of the NIRI's funding for 1999.42 Whatever can

be said of the scientific advances made with this public investment, the
concrete financial return to taxpayers is minimal. But perhaps more
importantly than the absence of any concrete return is the inevitability
of even greater public or consumer expenditures demanded by the

monopolies obtained by industry over publicly financed inventions,
and the resulting supracompetitive profits and prices. The public has
already paid for the cost of research. The government's failure to
police these economic abuses is the untold scandal of federally
financed inventions and of the failure of the Bayh-Dole Act, which
was meant to provide that policing.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY-TRANSFER Acrrv-TY
Prior to the 1980s, there was effectively a free market
technology-transfer policy in the United States.43 For the most part,
the government argued that if public funds produced patentable
inventions, then title to those inventions should remain with the
government and the public." Despite the fact that government patent
rights were available to all on a come-one-come-all basis, that free and

unregulated situation paradoxically led to a large number of
government-owned patents that were not licensed.45 Industry had

insufficient incentive to commercialize government-developed
inventions, because federal research was disseminated without
restriction.46 The lack of commercialization persisted despite the fact
41.

Id.

42.

NIH FEDERAL OBLIGATIONS, supra note 21.

43. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and PrivateDevelopment: Patents
and Technology Transferin Government-SponsoredResearch,82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1663-64
(1996).
44. Cf. id. at 1663 ("Previous legislation had typically encouraged or required that
federal agencies sponsoring research make the results widely available to the public through
government ownership or dedication to the public domain.").
45. See James V. Lacy et al., Technology TransferLaws GoverningFederallyFunded
Research andDevelopment, 19 PmPP. L. REv. 1, 8 (1991).
46. The evidence marshaled to support this claim is elusive at best. A few voices
noted, when the Bayh-Dole Act was being considered, that figures on the utilization of
government patents were hopelessly insufficient because the government did not enforce
those patents-to the contrary, it gave them away on a come-one-come-all basis-and thus
had no way of knowing, in any respect at all, how much of its patented technology was being
used by others. See, e.g., Patent and TrademarkLaw Amendments of 1980: Hearingson
H.R. 6933 Before a Subcomm. ofthe House Comm. on Gov't Operations,96th Cong. 79-83
(1980) [hereinafter 1980 House Gov't Operations Hearings] (statement of Adm. H.G.
Rickover, Deputy Commander for Nuclear Power, Naval Sea Sys. Command); PatentPolicy:
Hearings on S.1215 Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Tech., & Space of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci.," & Transp., 96th Cong. 389-396 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Sci.

HeinOnline -- 75 Tul. L. Rev. 640 2000-2001

2001]

ENFORCINGDRUG PRICE CONTROLS

that, because all R&D had been completed, much of the risky
investment had already been made by the government.47
There were some exceptions in which patent rights were not
made available on this come-one-come-all basis. Between World War
II and 1980, for instance, patent policy for inventions made with
government resources was often based on statutes governing specific
agencies.48 The Department of Defense, for instance, permfitted
contractors to acquire exclusive commercial rights to inventions while
obtaining a royalty-free license for itself.49 The Federal Aviation
Administration's policy was to retain all invention rights in its
contracts for R&D as well as to recoup development costs from
industry." Notwithstanding these exceptions, the bulk of government
inventions, and certainly almost all health-related inventions, were
freely available to private industry. While the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) formally retained full rights to its
intramural inventions and those developed under its research contracts,
it in fact excluded no one from this technology. Historically, HEW's
policy objective was to make the results of its research freely available
to the public. This was done by patenting or publishing inventions and
by issuing nonexclusive licenses to all applicants. 2 While the stated
policy objective of the Department (now known as the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS)) has not changed,5 3 post-1980
technology-transfer legislation removes many federally supported
inventions from government ownership and places them in the private
sector.5 4 This legislation represents a massive shift of the fruit of
public investment to the private sector.
Hearings] (statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover); The University and Small Business Patent
ProceduresAct: Hearingson S.414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong. 15971 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate JudiciaryHearings](testimony of Adm. H.G. Rickover);
Government Patent Policies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly &
Anticompetitive Activities of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 3-53 (1977)
[hereinafter 1977 Senate Small Bus. Hearings] (testimony and statement of Adm. H.G.

Rickover).
47. See Eisenberg,supranote 43, at 1668, 1680.
48. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1671-95; Lacy et al., supranote 45, at 3-10.
49. Lacy et al., supranote 45, at 6.
50. Parke M. Banta & Manuel B. Hiller, PatentPoliciesofthe Departmentofftealth,
Education, and Welfare, 21 FED. B.J. 89, 98 n.36 (1961).
51. Id. at 93.
52. 45 C.F.R. § 6 (1960), rescinded by 61 Fed. Reg. 54,743, 54,743-44 (Oct. 22,
1996) (effectuating the removal of obsolete patent regulations); Banta & Hiller, supra note

50, at 93.
53. See 45 C.F.R. § 6 (1960). For current government policy, as enacted by the
Department of Commerce, which has assumed overall responsibility for regulating
inventions and patents, see 37 C.F.R. pt. 401 (2000).
54. See Eisenberg, supranote 43, at 1663-64.
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In 1963, President Kennedy attempted to standardize the federal
patent system by issuing a memorandum that recognized that the
rights to publicly funded, health-related inventions should remain in
government." Prior to the issuance of the memorandum, a system of
waivers had developed under which various government agencies
either waived rights to title entirely or granted exclusive licenses to the
contractor. 6 Some agencies had resorted to waivers so much that the
term became a misnomer, and the basic policy of the agency actually
became one of presumptive licensing or title. 7 When Kennedy
promoted a standardization of the patent system, he recommended that
the government retain principal rights when the invention was
commercially useful to the general public or useful for public health
and welfare, or when government was the principal developer in the
field." In contrast to Kennedy's policy, much of the technologytransfer legislation introduced in the 1980s-including, of course, the
Bayh-Dole Act-does not consider the social utility of an invention,
such as its impact on public health, for the purpose of assigning a new
patent.. However, some statutory regimes in those areas unaffected by
the Bayh-Dole Act still consider social value as a part of the decision
to either license or wholly transfer title.59 At the present time, there are
a number of laws, such as the Bayh-Dole Act, that address technology
transfer and that also provide price-control mechanisms.
Unfortunately, these mechanisms, especially and most specifically the
"march-in" provisions, have never been enforced and seem to be
purposely disregarded, even though they effectively provide price
control over research performed under most, though not all, federal
programs." A description of the major pieces of current technology
transfer legislation follows.
55. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Government Patent Policy), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1959-1963).
56. See 1979 Senate JudiciaryHearings,supranote 46, at 3; 1977 Senate Small Bus.
Hearings,supranote 46, at 3.
57. See 1979 Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 46, at 183; 1977 Senate Small
Bus. Hearings,supra note 46, at 3 ("[T]oday, many Government agencies routinely grant

contractors exclusive rights....').
58. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
(Government Patent Policy), 3 C.F.R. 861 (1959-1963).

59.

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 209(c)(1)(A) (1994) (considering whether "the interests of

the Federal Government and the public will best be served" by granting a license). Outside
the small business blanket transfer policy of the Bayh-Dole Act, and without regard to
presidential directives, agency discretion to grant exclusive or nonexclusive licenses is

theoretically cabined by the requirement to consider the "interests of the Federal Government
and the public." Id.

60. The GAO asserts that "the basic provisions of the act-which apply only to
universities, other nonprofit organizations, and small businesses-were extended to large
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Stevenson- Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980.61 The
Stevenson-Wydler Act made technology transfer a mission of
It also
government-owned, contractor-operated laboratories.62
required that all federal labs establish an Office of Research and
Technology Applications.63
64
Bayh-Dole University and Small Business PatentAct of 1980.
The Bayh-Dole Act was designed to promote interaction between
industry and academia by allowing universities to license inventions
developed with federal funds to private companies.65 The Act allows
nonprofit and small business government contractors to retain title to,
and obtain royalties from, most government-funded inventions. 66 A
1987 presidential memorandum instructed federal agencies to apply
some Bayh-Dole rights to all contractors, regardless of their size.67
This regime applies to virtually all research funded by the
businesses by Executive Order 12591, dated April 10, 1987."

ADMINISTRATION OF THE

BAYH-DOLE ACr, supranote 2, at 4. It is probably true that most transfers, whether by title or
licensing, are subject to the march-in provisions as well as the reasonable pricing
requirements imposed by the "practical application" mandate of the Act, though this Article
is limited to a discussion of the Bayh-Dole Act. See infra note 67.
61. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3717 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
62. Id. §§ 3701(3), (8), (10), 3702(2)-(3), 3704(c)(1l)-(12), 3710a.
63. Id. § 3710(b).

64.

35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-212 (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).

65. Id.
66. Id. § 201(a).
67. See Exec. OrderNo. 12,591,3 C.F.R. 220 (1988). However, at least with respect
to Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) and other similar
arrangements, the issue of the application of the Bayh-Dole Act to all contractors is
unresolved. Two executive orders frequently cited in this area are Executive Order 12,591
and Executive Order 12,618. Although both orders do extend the reach of the Bayh-Dole
Act to funding recipients other than small businesses and nonprofits, they do so primarily
only with respect to § 202(7), which simply provides parameters for how royalties are to be
divided between the government and others. The more relevant provision of the Bayh-Dole
Act with respect to its application to such recipients is § 210(c). It demonstrates that
Congress intended that the Act, at least with respect to the price-control march-in provision
(§ 203), should apply to virtually all recipients of government funds. Section 210(c)
provides, "Nothing inthis chapter isintended to limit the authority of agencies... except that
all funding agreements, includingthose with other than small businessfirms and nonprofit
organizations,shall include the requirements established in ...section 203 . . . ." 35 U.S.C.
§ 210(c) (1994) (emphasis added). The only qualification is that contained in § 210(e),
which states that the provisions of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of
1980, the Act that authorizes CRADAs, "shall take precedence.., to the extent they permit
or require a disposition of rights ... inconsistent with this chapter." Id. § 2 10(e). Whether
there are such inconsistencies is arguable, especially in view of 15 U.S.C.
§ 3710a(b)(1)(B)(i), which allows for licensing to a "responsible applicant.., on terms that
are reasonable," but because such licensing can only be done when there are "health or safety
needs that are not reasonably satisfied by the collaborating party," an argument can be made
15 U.S.C.
that this specifically excludes the "practical application" requirement.
§ 3710a(b)(1)(C)(i) (Supp. 111997).
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government," either in whole or in part, and effects a price-control
strategy to insure that private industry does not abuse what would
otherwise be a massive giveaway of public investment. 9 This price-

control mechanism has never been implemented or publicly discussed
or explained by any administration and apparently has been grossly
misunderstood by bureaucrats, including, recently, the NIH itself.7
FederalTechnology TransferAct of 1986 (TA). 71 The FTTA
was a 1986 amendment to the Stevenson-Wydler Act. It encouraged

federal laboratories to work cooperatively with universities or the
private sector by allowing government-owned and -operated
laboratories to enter directly into Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements (CRADAs) with industry and universities.'

The legislation permits laboratories to assign a patent or grant a
manufacturing license to cost-sharing CRADA partners.73 The Act
also requires that government inventors share in royalties from patent
To the extent, however, that CRADAs are also
licenses.74

68. There seems to be disagreement in some areas, wholly outside pharmaceutical
research, about whether the Bayh-Dole Act controls other programs with which it overlaps,
including, for instance, those of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department
of Defense (ARPA). The Bayh-Dole Act comes into play when the research is conducted
under a government "funding agreement," which is further defined in the statute to be a
"contract, grant, or cooperative agreement." 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). Congress has
endorsed the view that ARPA's "other transactions" fall outside the scope of the Bayh-Dole
Act. The conference report of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 stated:
The conferees also recognize that the regulations applicable to the allocation of
patent and data rights under the procurement statutes may not be appropriate to
partnership arrangements in certain cases. The conferees believe that the option to
support "partnerships" pursuant to section 2371 of title 10, United States Code,
provides adequate flexibility for the Defense Department and other partnership
participants to agree to allocations of intellectual property rights in a manner that
will meet the needs of all parties involved in a transaction.
NASA Procurementin the Earth-SpaceEconomy: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Sei.,
104th Cong. 26, 36 (1995) (testimony of Richard L. Dunn, Gen. Counsel, Advanced
Research Projects Agency).
69. The price-control mechanism, of course, is the requirement that contractors or
their licensees achieve "practical application," which is uniformly defined by statute as
requiring that the invention be supplied to the public on "reasonable terms." 35 U.S.C.
§ 201(f) (1994). Section 201(f) and its accompanying legislative history make clear that the
focus should be on price. See infra notes 175-227 and accompanying text.
70. As we discuss infra notes 294-313 and accompanying text, the NIH failed to
understand and apply, in the CeliPro case, the requirement for "practical application"
mandated by the Bayh-Dole Act, collapsing it into a much simpler, but nonexistent, mandate
for mere utilization.
71. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3714 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
72. See id. § 3702(5).
73. Id. §3710a(b)(2).
74. Id. §3710c.
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government-funded, in whole or in part, or to the extent that the BayhDole Act's definition of funding (which includes cooperative
agreements)75 embraces CRADAs irrespective of literal funding, they
may nevertheless also be regulated by the Bayh-Dole Act and thus
subject to its unexercised price-control mechanism.76 The FTIA gives
federal labs the option to retain intellectual property rights to work that
has been jointly developed with private parties.7 Industry concern
that the government had retained a channel for claiming rights to
jointly developed work led to proposed legislation in 1993 that would
have amended the FTrA to mandate that the private collaborator be
granted title to jointly developed projects.78 The bill was defeated, but
it was reintroduced in June 1995 and passed with some changes in
1996."9 The law as it now stands gives the federal lab the option to
grant the collaborating party an exclusive license.8"
Section 5171 of the Omnibus Trade and CompetitivenessAct of
1988.81 Section 5171 requires that federally supported international
science and technology agreements be negotiated to ensure that
intellectual property rights are properly protected. 2 Again, the BayhDole Act would still apply as another layer of public protection,
including, most importantly, its price-control mechanism.
NationalCompetitivenessTechnology TransferAct.83 This Act is
a 1989 amendment to the Stevenson-Wydler Act that extends the
CRADA authority of the FTTA to labs owned by the government and
operated by private contractors."' Once again, as long as the
arrangements involve federal funding, the Bayh-Dole Act and its
price-control
mechanism might constitute another layer of public
85
protection.

75.

The Act defines "funding agreement" to mean "any contract, grant, or

cooperative agreement" 35 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
76. See supranote 67.

77.

15 U.S.C.A. § 3710a(b)(2) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).

78.

Technology Transfer Improvement Act,H.R. 3590, 103d Cong. (1993).

79.

See National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.

104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A.).
80. Id.
81.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 1107.
82. Id. at 1211-16.
83. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701-3710 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
84. Seeid.§3710a(a).
85. As one commentator explained:
Ownership of inventions made during a CRADA is governed by much the same
scheme in the Bayh-Dole Act. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 3710a allows the Federal

laboratory to grant licenses or assignments to an invention made in whole or in part
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The Bayh-Dole Act is the most relevant of these and is the focus

of this Article.
IV. THEBAYH-DOLEACT
A.

GeneralOverview

The Bayh-Dole Act, passed in 1980, was a major departure from
the government's earlier practice of retaining title to nearly all the
inventions it funded. 6 The new policy was designed to provide an
incentive for research and to increase the competitiveness of U.S.
industry by granting title to certain recipients of federal R&D funds87
and then encouraging those recipients to develop the inventions or to
license others in industry to put the inventions to commercial use. At
the same time, the policy ensured that there could be no abuse of the
title incentive by enacting a strict price-control mechanism as part of
by a laboratory employee to a collaborating partner and/or to waive ownership to
an invention made during the agreement by a collaborating party.
Mark R. Wisner, ProposedChangesto the Laws Governing Ownership of InventionsMade
with FederalFunding, 2 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 193, 196 (1994). Moreover, under 15
U.S.C.A. § 3710a(a)(2), authority is granted "to negotiate licensing agreements under section
207 of title 35."
As it turns out, although 35 U.S.C. § 207, part of the Bayh-Dole Act, does not impose
the same requirements of "practical application," § 209, which applies to "any license under a
patent or patent application on a federally owned invention," is replete with references to the
"practical application" requirement. 35 U.S.C. § 209 (1994). It is thus not clear that there is
even a "funding" requirement necessary to trigger the Bayh-Dole Act. It seems likely that
any license of CRADA patents is subject to the resulting reasonable price requirements.
86. Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 1663-64. Eisenberg notes that
[t]he year 1980 marked a sea change in U.S. government policy toward intellectual
property rights in the results of government-sponsored research. In two statutes
passed that year, Congress endorsed a new vision of how best to get these research
results utilized in the private sector. Previous legislation had typically encouraged
or required that federal agencies sponsoring research make the results widely
available to the public through government ownership or dedication to the public
domain.
Id. at 1663 (footnotes omitted).
87. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994). The stated purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act are:
[T]o use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from
federally supported research or development; to encourage maximum participation
of small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations,
including universities; to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations
and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and
enterprise; to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions
made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the
Government obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the
needs of the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable
use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area.
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the so-called march-in rights maintained by the government to oversee
its investments."8
The Act automatically grants small businesses and nonprofit
organizations, defined almost exclusively as academic institutions, the
right to retain ownership of "subject inventions" made in whole or in
part with federal dollars.8 9 Subject inventions are defined as any
inventions that the "contractor conceived or first actually reduced to
practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement."9
This means that any ideas conceived during funding-by the
contractor or others-that ultimately lead to patents (even if actually
reduced to practice long after the funding expires), in addition to those
inventions that are actually reduced to practice during the funding
grant, are subject to the Act, including its price-control mechanisms.
In exchange, the government receives a nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice the invention on behalf of the
United States anywhere in the world.91 The government also receives
certain minimal royalties92 and, most importantly, the right to "marchin" when the contractor, or any person to whom the patent is
ultimately assigned, does not provide the invention to the public at a
reasonable price.93
To claim these rights, the government must be informed of the
progress, patents, and inventions resulting from its funding
agreements. The Act gives contractors two months from the time their
patent counsel is informed of an invention to disclose it to the federal
agency and two years to decide whether to retain title.94 Once the
contractor elects to retain title, it has one year to file a patent

88.

Id. § 203.

89.

35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-212 (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).

90.
91.
92.
93.

35 U.S.C. § 201(e).
Id. §203.
37 C.F.R. § 401.5(g)(3) (2000).
35 U.S.C. §§ 201(f, 203. March-in rights require a license-holding agent to

yield the license to a responsible applicant if there is an inappropriate delay in achieving
"practical application" of the invention. Id. § 203(a). Practical application means both of the
following: (I) that the invention is being utilized and (2) that its benefits are, to the extent
permitted by law or government regulations, available to the public at reasonable prices. Id.
Thus, the requirement for reasonable prices derives directly from the mandate that all such
inventions achieve "practical application" and, therefore, be available to the public on
"reasonable terms." See infra Parts V-VII. There are other grounds, not at issue here, upon
which march-in rights can be based, including health and safety needs, public use needs, and

domestic manufacturing requirements. 35 U.S.C. § 203(b)-(d). If the contractor does not
yield the license, then the federal agency may grant the license itself. Id. § 203.

94.

35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1)-(2) (1994); 37 C.F.R § 401.14(c)(l)-(2) (2000).
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application that includes a legend regarding the government's rights to
the invention.95
Various provisions impose obligations upon the contractor,
including the duties to disclose a subject invention to the federal
agency that funded it,96 to decide within a reasonable period of time
whether to retain title to the invention or give it to the government to
patent,97 and to ensure that there is a legend on the patent application
(and, thereby, on any resulting patent) specifying that the invention
was made with federal funds and that the government has certain
rights in it.98 Importantly, this last requirement and the resulting
march-in rights do not only apply to the contractor. The rights attach
to the invention and any resulting patent. 99 Thus, even if a patent is
eventually granted to others, if it resulted from the original federal
funding (meaning that it yielded the bare idea or conception of the
invention), the later patent should bear the legend and be subject to the
entire Act.
The Act leaves much, including enforcement, up to individual
federal agencies.
The implementing regulations state that the
contractor "shall establish ...procedures to ensure that subject
inventions are promptly identified and timely disclosed."'" The Act
itself does not require that the federal government elect to retain title if
the contractor fails to fulfill the above requirements, but merely states
that it may.10 ' It states that agencies have a "right" to receive periodic
reports on utilization, but does not require it. 02 It does not expressly
establish any mechanism whereby the funding agencies can reliably
learn whether patentees are honoring their obligation to charge no
more than a reasonable price for an invention.0 3 What is worse, it
appears that funding grantees have engaged in a more or less
wholesale flouting of their responsibilities to self-report,'° which has
95.

37 C.F.R. § 401.14(c)(3). This is referred to as the "Bayh-Dole legend."

96.

35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(1).

97.

Id. § 202(c)(2).

98.

Id. § 202(c)(6).

99. See id. § 203. Section 203 applies march-in rights to any "subject invention" and
does not limit itself to the contractor who discovered or patented it. See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 201(d), which broadly defines "invention" as "any invention or discovery which is or may
be patentable or otherwise protectable under this title."

100. 37 C.F.1R § 401.5(h)(5) (2000).
101. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a).
102. Id. § 202(c)(5).
103. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-212 (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).
104. The GAO recognizes what is essentially an honor system not only as the Bayh-

Dole Act's chief characteristic but also as its major flaw: "The administration of the BayhDole Act is decentralized and relies heavily on voluntary compliance by the universities."
ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DoLE ACr, supranote 2, at 6.
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resulted in a kind of land grab in which researchers receive funding but
uniformly fail to include the Bayh-Dole legend in any resulting

patents. °5 Ironically, although the goal of the Bayh-Dole Act was to
make policies for government inventions uniform, the fact that each
agency imposed its own rules seriously undermined and balkanized
the statute until the uniform Commerce Department rules were
enacted. The result is possibly worse, however, under the Commerce
Department rules, because the Commerce Department issued
implementing regulations with no facilities for oversight," 6 leaving the
agencies to enforce the Act with no direction and little expertise. 7
B.

The Meaningof "ReasonableTerns"
What "available to the public on reasonableterms"''0 means is

not jurisprudentially troublesome, even absent the clear legislative
history of the term.0 9 U.S. law has always held that, absent a clearly
explicit statutory intent to the contrary, ordinary words such as these
105. Wendy Baldwin, Deputy Director for Extramural Research for the NIH, noted
evidence of this land grab in her statement to Congress:
As a pilot project to further evaluate reporting compliance, we have contacted 20
institutions to reconcile our records with theirs and to provide additional utilization
information. Fifteen of these institutions are among those that report the greatest
number of patents supported by Federal funding agreements and their responses
will help to determine the completeness of their previous reporting. Five of the
institutions report few patents with Federal support even though they are among
our top 100 recipients.
UnderreportingFederalInvolvement in New Technologies Developed at Scripps Research
Institute: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Regulation, Bus. Opportunities,& Tech. of the
House Comm. on Small Bus., 103d Cong. 104 (1994) [hereinafter UnderreportingFederal
Involvement] (statement of Wendy Baldwin, Ph.D., Deputy Dir. of Extramural Research,
Nat'l Insts. of Health).
106. The lack of oversight is both total and somewhat shocking: "Despite the
perception that Bayh-Dole is working well, none of the federal agencies or universities we
contacted evaluated the effects of Bayh-Dole." ADMINISTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT,
supranote 2, at 15.
107. The GAO reported:
The administration of the [Bayh-Dole Act] is decentralized. Each federal agency
awarding R&D funds is required to ensure that the universities receiving such
funds abide by the [A]ct's requirements. The agency that comes closest to
coordinating the Bayh-Dole Act is the Department of Commerce. The [A]ct, as
amended, provided that Commerce could issue regulations for the program and
establish standards for provisions in the funding agreement entered into by federal
agencies and universities, other nonprofit institutions, and small businesses.
Commerce did so in 1987. Commerce is looked upon by the other agencies as a
type of coordinator and may be consulted when questions arise. However,
Commerce does not maintain any overall Bayh-Dole database.
Id. at 6.
108. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1994) (emphasis added).
109. See infra notes 146-266 and accompanying text.
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must be interpreted with their ordinary meaning.1 ° The Supreme
Court has said, "When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous,
judicial inquiry is complete except in rare and exceptional
circumstances." ' Justice Scalia has stated the rule succinctly:
[F]irst, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual context;
and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there
is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the
ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a good reason for the
ordinary meaning appears plain-we apply that ordinary meaning. 2
Lower courts, following the Supreme Court, have noted that the
"ordinary meaning" rule is binding. The Federal Circuit, quoting
Supreme Court cases, has stated the rule thus: "[L]egislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used .... ,113 The
court also noted that "[ilt is a basic principle of statutory interpretation
... that undefined terms in a statute are deemed to have their
ordinarily understood meaning."1 4
In the United States in similar contexts, the words "reasonable
terms" have uniformly been interpreted to include price. In Byars v.
Bluff City News Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, recognizing that establishing "reasonable terms" is necessary
to remedy a monopolistic market, noted that "[t]he difficulty of setting
reasonable terms, especially price, should be a substantial factor" in
how to proceed. 1 Similarly, in American Liberty Oil Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, interpreting a statute that allows the Federal Power
Commission to establish "reasonable terms and conditions," concluded that this meant that the "price ... must be reasonable.""' 6 In
Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Mellon, the United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed prices under a statute that
demanded "reasonable terms as to quality, price and delivery"; this
language shows that the word "terms" includes, as a matter of
common sense, the element of price.'1 7 In United States v. Mississippi
Vocational Rehabilitationfor the Blind, the United States District
110. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 232 (1993).
111. Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991).
112. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Cook v. Brown, 68 F.3d 447,451 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 136 (1991)).
114. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Best Power Tech.
Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
115. 609 F.2d 843, 864 n.58 (6th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
116. 301F.2d 15,18 (5thCir. 1962).
117. 277 F. 548,549 (D.C. Cir. 1922).
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Court for the Southern District of Mississippi similarly interpreted a
statute that allowed organizations to operate vending machines on
"reasonable terms" at the Stennis Space Center."' Such reasonable
' 19
terms, the court implied, include "prices and vending operations."
In Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. v. MajorLeague BaseballPlayersAss "n,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
resolved a dispute between baseball players and a playing card
company that had agreed to pay "commercially reasonable terms"; the
court said, "I assume [commercially reasonable terms] means at a
1 20
price higher than Topps cunently pays under its player contracts.
In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., the United States
District Court for the D.C. Circuit held that "reasonable terms and
conditions" includes prices.121
Finally, in South Central Bell
Telephone Co. v. LouisianaPublic Service Commission, the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered the meaning of "reasonable terms" and
concluded that, although such things as timing and performance might
be important, the most important and central factor is, of course, price:
Thus ...regulation must make it possible ...to compete ....The
utility's earnings, i.e., its return, both actual and prospective, must be
suffcient... so that it can attract... capital on reasonable terms. The
rate of return is but an intermediate factor; the basic requirement is a
fair and reasonable dollar return.
In order to attract capital on reasonable terms, the utility [must] be
able to pay the goingprice ....In the last analysis regulation seeks to
set utility prices ....
The requirement for "practical application" seems clearly to
authorize the federal government to review the prices of drugs
developed with public funding under Bayh-Dole terms and to mandate
march-in when prices exceed a reasonable level. The terms required
by the Bayh-Dole Act include, but are not limited to, reasonable
prices." Terms may be considered unreasonable if the unit price is
too high or if its use over the long term makes it too costly with respect
to the investment, costs, and profits of the manufacturer.1 24 Despite
somewhat unbelievable complaints from the NIH that this price review
is beyond its ability, the traditional judicial and agency competence to
118. 812 F. Supp. 85, 87-89 (S.D. Miss. 1992).
119. Id. at 87.
120. 641 F. Supp. 1179, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
121. 67 F. Supp. 397,433-41 (D.D.C. 1946).
122. 373 So. 2d 478,480-81 n.1 (La. 1979).
123. See infra notes 175-227 and accompanying text.
124. See United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. at 433-41; S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 373
So. 2d at 480-81 n.1.
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determine reasonableness of prices is supported by countless cases and
a host of statutes, including, for instance, the reasonable price
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),125 the reasonable
royalty remedies of patent law," 6 the similar provisions of copyright
law, 12 7 the compulsory licensing provisions of antitrust law,' the price

125. U.C.C. § 2-305(1)(a) (2000); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-97
(1989). See generally Koch Hydrocarbon Co. v. MDU Res. Group, Inc., 988 F.2d 1529,
1534-35 (8th Cir. 1993) (determining what constitutes a "reasonable price" for natural gas
after deregulation pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-305); N. Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 574
F.2d 582, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining what constitutes a "reasonable price" for
aviation fuel in the wake of the early 1970s OPEC oil embargo and the resulting federal price
controls, pursuant to U.C.C. § 2-305); Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668 F. Supp. 861, 877879 (D. Del. 1987). The UCC, which governs commercial transactions in forty-nine states,
gives courts the power to determine reasonable prices and even to enforce contracts on the
basis of what a reasonable price would be, for instance, where the contract does not
specifically state any price (the so-called open-price situation): "The parties if they so intend
can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price
is a reasonable price at the time for delivery .... " U.C.C. § 2-305(1). The drafters of the
UCC unabashedly placed their faith in the ability of a court to determine what a reasonable
price would be: "In many valid contracts for sale the parties do not mention the price in
express terms, the buyer being bound to pay and the seller to accept a reasonable price which
the trier of the fact may well be trusted to determine." Id. § 2-201, cmt. n. 1.
126. The Patent Act expressly grants a reasonable royalty, the amount to be
determined by the court after hearing evidence, to an aggrieved patent owner: "Upon finding
for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention
by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court." 35 U.S.C. § 284
(1994).
127. The copyright statute, unlike the patent law, does not expressly grant a reasonable
royalty. However, in many cases, assessing profits unlawfully garnered by an infringing
defendant requires a court to determine what a reasonable royalty would be. See, e.g., Sherry
Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 855 (S.D. Fla. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 753 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the assessment of reasonable
royalties by courts and agencies is an integral part of the administration of the copyright
regime. The copyright law, in section 118, grants public broadcasting a compulsory license
for use of nondramatic literary and musical works, as well as pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works, subject to the payment of reasonable royalty fees to be set by the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal. See H. REP. No. 94-1476, at 116 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5732.
128. A compulsory license, at reasonable royalty rates, is a remedy occasionally
granted in response to antitrust violations. "The appropriateness of compulsory licensing at
reasonable royalty rates as an antitrust remedy has long been recognized." A. Samuel Oddi,
ContributoryInfringement/PatentMisuse: Metaphysics andMetamorphosis, 44 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 73, 125 (1982); see Carlisle M. Moore, Note, A Study of Compulsory Licensing and
DedicationofPatents as Relief Measures in Antitrust Cases, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 223,
223-27 (1955).

HeinOnline -- 75 Tul. L. Rev. 652 2000-2001

2001]

ENFORCINGDR UG PRICE CONTROLS

653

' and public utility rate
control provisions of the Orphan Drug Act, 29
regulation cases.130
The language of the Bayh-Dole Act implies that the contractor
has the burden of providing, upon a good faith request by the
government, data showing that it charged a reasonable price."' At
present the federal government may not grant a license on a federally
owned invention unless it has been supplied with a development or
marketing plan. 32 It would be appropriate to require the contractor to
provide the data necessary to determine a reasonable price as part of
the development or marketing plan.

C. The Reach of the Act and the BroadScope of "Subject
Inventions"
Determining whether an invention was made with government
funds (and is therefore a "subject invention") is a complex task that
can easily lead to, and be the subject of, unpredictable litigation.'
The Bayh-Dole Act defines a subject invention as any invention that
the "contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the
performance of work under a funding agreement."' 34 However the
implementing regulations of the legislation, which attempt to specify
what is meant by "subject invention," do not settle the issue.3 The
regulations state that a closely related project that falls "outside the
planned and committed activities of a government-funded project and
does not diminish or distract from the performance of such activities
... would not be subject to the conditions of these regulations."' 36 The
language here seems to invite litigation and almost defies
comprehension.

129. Orphan Drug Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.)
2049-66.
130. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 373 So. 2d 478,48081 n.1 (La. 1979) (discussing the importance of price controls).
131. There is some support in the legislative history for concluding that the contractor
bears the burden of proof on this question. Cf. Government Patent Policies: Institutional
Patent Agreements: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly & Anticompetitive
Activities of the Select S. Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 397 (1978) [hereinafter 1978
Hearings](statement of Howard W. Bremer, patent counsel, Wis. Alumni Research Found.).
132. 35 U.S.C.A. § 209(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).
133. See S. Research Inst. v. Griffin Corp., 938 F.2d 1249 (11th Cir. 1991); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Ctr. for
Neurologic Study, 853 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804
F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1992).

134. 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1994).
135. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.1-.17 (2000).

136. Id. § 401.1(a)(1).

HeinOnline -- 75 Tul. L. Rev. 653 2000-2001

654

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 75:631

Because the regulations limit the reach of the Bayh-Dole Act to

"planned," as opposed to unexpected, events, there is some question as
to whether they faithffilly implement the intent of the statute. In fact,
they seem to negate the very essence of invention and thus of the
Bayh-Dole Act itself. Inventions, by definition, are technological
advances that are unexpected and unplanned.137 The Bayh-Dole Act
seeks to preserve a governmental interest in such unexpected events

that owe their genesis to government funding. But these regulations
seem to exempt inventions that were not "planned"-i.e., those that
were unexpected-which means that they may exclude from the Act
exactly that which it was intended to govern.' 38 Furthermore,
"conditions of these regulations" could be interpreted to mean that
extracontractual work is beyond the reach of the statute, a result
unsupported by administrative law.139

The Act applies to any patents for subject inventions, not merely
patents held or obtained by the recipients of government funds. 4'
Thus, if a firm were to buy intellectual property rights from an Act
recipient, any resulting patent would remain subject to the Act and
would have to state that the invention was made
with federal funds and
1 41
it.
to
rights
certain
has
that the government
137. The Patent Act requires that, to be patentable, an invention must be
"nonobvious." "A patent may not be obtained.., if the... subject matter... would have
been obvious .... " 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a) (West 1984 & Supp. 2000). Nonobviousness is
defined in the Act as a technological advance that would not be obvious "to a person having
ordinary skill" in the relevant technology. Id. The Supreme Court has often likened
nonobviousness to unexpectedness. "Mhe Adams battery was... nonobvious. As we have
seen, the operating characteristics of the Adams battery have been shown to have been
unexpected and to have far surpassed then-existing wet batteries." United States v. Adams,
383 U.S. 39,51(1966). The Federal Circuit has held "a finding of 'unexpected results' to be
tantamount to a finding ofnonobviousness." Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948,
954 n.28 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Inventions are, therefore, by legal definition, unexpected events
(among other things, of course). The implementing regulations of the Bayh-Dole Act, by
excluding the "unexpected," seem to exclude exactly that which they might otherwise
regulate; that is, they seem to regulate the Act out of much of its relevance.
138. Indeed, a patent cannot be obtained if the innovation "would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill." 35 U.S.C.A. § 103(a).
Therefore, nonobvious, unexpected, unplanned events are precisely the events that fumish the
substance of patentable inventions.
139. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992) ("Deference
does not mean acquiescence. As in other contexts in which we defer to an administrative
interpretation of a statute, we do so only if Congress has not expressed its intent with respect
to the question, and then only if the administrative interpretation is reasonable.').
140. See supranote 99 and accompanying text.
141. It should be noted that if an Act recipient obtains a patent and is subject to the
Act, any licensing to commercial entities would be similarly subject to the Act, since the
patent under which both parties are operating must,at least legally, bear the Act's legend and
thus be subject to march-in rights. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (1994) (requiring that patent
applications for subject inventions contain, on "the specification of such application and any
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In Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that an invention is conceived as soon as someone
has the idea of the invention, even if no work has been performed to

test its practicability.1 42 The inventor, however, need not know that the
invention will work nor obtain any experimental data to demonstrate

its workability.' 43 It follows that if an invention is conceived as soon
as someone has a bare, untested idea, the provisions of the Bayh-Dole
Act are likely to apply to most inventions made with, or perhaps only

even associated with, government funding. Thus, when a company
purchases a recipient's intellectual property rights, it cannot claim that
it is doing the inventive work. Under Burroughs Wellcome, if the
recipient had a bare, untested idea while receiving government funds

(and most will have done far more than that), any resulting patent
obtained by commercial transferees
must bear the Bayh-Dole legend
44
and is subject to march-in rights.'
Because the Act is aimed at the resulting patent and the
Burroughs Wellcome decision moves the date of conception of a

subject invention to a much earlier point in time, the Act will apply to
far more commercial transferees of patent rights than it would have
patent issuing thereon, a statement specifying that the invention was made with Government
support and that the Government has certain rights in the invention"). Perhaps the most
important aspect of the Bayh-Dole Act, therefore, is that the Act and its reasonable pricing
requirement attach not to the contractor, but to the invention itself, no matter who might
eventually obtain a patent upon it.
Thus, while it might appear to a commercial entity that it could buy the rights from a
recipient, especially if the recipient agrees not to pursue the patent itself, the Act clearly states
that a patent resulting from a recipient's research, rather than a patent obtained by a recipient,
is subject to the Act. See id. §§ 201(e), 202(c)(6), 203(1). It nevertheless appears, though
this would have to be confirmed by further research and perhaps litigation, that many
contractors transfer their research prior to the patent application. This is not so much a
violation of the law as it is what should be held to be a legally unsuccessful attempt to evade
it. However, because the government has given itself only sixty days in which to act,these
attempts at evasion may be practically, ifnot legally, effective. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d)(1)
(2000) (requiring that the government take action within sixty days of learning of the failure
of a contractor to disclose an invention or to elect title to it).
142. See 40 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
143. The Federal Circuit has defined "conception" in such a way that not only will a
"wild guess" qualify, but it can be so wild that even an inventor might reject it as beyond the
limits of scientific possibility:
Thus, the test for conception is whether the inventor had an idea that was definite
and permanent enough that one skilled in the art could understand the invention
But an inventor need not know that his invention will work for conception
to be complete....
...An inventor's belief that his invention will work or his reasons for
choosing a particular approach are irrelevant to conception ....
Id. at 1228.
144. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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prior to Burroughs Wellcome. Almost any research performed by a
recipient that results in conception, however untested or apparently

impractical, will give rise to a resulting patent under the Act, no matter
who might later apply for the patent.
There are undoubtedly many such pharmaceuticals now on the
market that should be subject to the Act but lack the Bayh-Dole
legend. These include drugs patented by Bayh-Dole contractors as

well as those patented by manufacturers for which the rights to the
underlying research or even mere conceptions were purchased or

licensed from Bayh-Dole contractors. These also include drugs based
on an idea, qualifying under Burroughs Wellcome, that an employee of
the funded contractor145took with him or her to a new employer such as
a drug manufacturer.
V.

THE LEGISLATIVE -ISTORY OF ThE BAYH-DOLE ACT

A.

Overview

Many of the controversial issues that currently surround publicprivate combinations were first discussed in the congressional hearings46
when the Bayh-Dole legislation was considered in the late 1970s.1
For example, many in favor of the legislation expressed fears that 47a
slump in American innovation threatened the nation's well-being.
There were also complaints about confusing and contradictory policies
among various federal agencies. 1 4 Proponents noted that contractors
must balance the benefits of receiving federal R&D assistance with the

145. This is because the statute requires only that conception occur during the federal
contract. See 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) ("The term 'subject invention' means any invention of the
contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under a
funding agreement." (emphasis added)). Under Burrough Wellcome, of course, conception
can be the wildest of guesses. See supranote 143 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 175-227 and accompanying text.
147. One author observed that Congress sought to
ensure effective transfer and commercial development of discoveries that would
otherwise languish in government and university archives. It would reinvigorate
U.S. industry by giving it a fresh infusion of new ideas that would enhance
productivity and create new jobs. And it would ensure that U.S.-sponsored
research discoveries were developed by U.S. firms, rather than by foreign
competitors who had too often come to dominate world markets for products based
on technologies pioneered in the United States.
Eisenberg, supranote 43, at 1664-65; see 1978 Hearings,supranote 131, at 575 (statement
of Donald R. Dunner, esq., on behalf of the Am. Patent Law Ass'n).
148. See 1979 Senate Sc. Hearings, supra note 46, at 216, 220 (testimony and
statement of Peter F. McCloskey, President, Elec. Indus. Ass'n); 1978 Hearings,supra note
131, at 572 (statement of Donald IRDunner).
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' The
need to protect the investment of the company's shareholders. 49
lack of a clearly defined mechanism for licensing government-owned
technology
was also cited as a purported reason for bureaucratic
1 50
delays.
In addition, burdensome patent policies were another barrier to
innovation and increased competition.1 51 Witnesses noted that fewer
than 5% of the 28,000 government-held patents had been licensed in
1979.152 A Justice Department analysis concluded that federal patent
policy did not properly benefit public investment because governmentfunded inventions were inadequately commercialized. 153 However,
one knowledgeable witness said that those kinds of conclusions were
completely unfounded and insupportable and that the very nature of
government patents-which were freely available without policingmade it impossible to know utilization rates.154 Penicillin was cited as,
evidence of industry's reluctance to commercialize products for which
patents and title are not available for private ownership. 55 In that case,
for eleven years prior to World War II, the federal government tried to
make penicillin available to industry, but no company was willing to
commercialize it. The war forced the government itself to develop
penicillin.1 56 There was also some testimony indicating that the
pharmaceutical industry acted as a bloc to extort a favorable
government patent policy
and boycotted government patents in order
57
to gain greater rights.'
Opponents of the Bayh-Dole Act questioned the need to provide
an automatic exclusive license. Witnesses from private industry,
Congress, and government agencies testified that even without an

149. See 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings, supra note 46, at 217, 220 (testimony and
statement of Peter F. McCloskey).
150. Seeid. at216-22.
151. PatentPolicy: Joint HearingBeforethe S. Comm. on Commerce,Sci., & Transp.
& the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong. 458-60 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 JointHearing]
(statement of Hon. Birch Bayh, U.S. Senator, Ind.).
152. S. REP. No. 96-480, at2 (1979).
153. 1980House Gov't OperationsHearings,supranote 46, at 95-96 (statement of Ky
P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice).
154. See id. at 79 (statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover); 1979 Senate Judiciary
Hearings,supranote 46, at 159 (same); 1977 Senate Small Bus. Hearings,supra note 46, at

3 (same).

155. See 1979 Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 46, at 146-47 (testimony of Dr.
Betsy Ancker-Johnson, Vice President, Gen. Motors, Envtl. Activities Staff).
156. See id. at 179 (testimony of Frederick N. Andrews, Vice President for Research,
Purdue Univ.).
157. Government PatentPolicy: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Domestic &Int'l
Scientific Planning& Analysis of the House Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 94th Cong. 723 (1976)
[hereinafter 1976Hearings](testimony ofNorman J Latker, Patent Counsel, HEW).
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exclusive patent, federal dollars and the sharing of scientific
information were reward enough.' 8 Representative Jack Brooks
(Texas), perhaps the harshest critic of the proposed legislation,
expressed doubts that granting an exclusive license to industry after
paying to develop a patentable invention was an incentive to
commercialize.'59 Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, then a Deputy
Commander for Nuclear Power for the United States Navy, feared that
the legislation would concentrate economic power in the hands of
large corporations and, contrary to its stated purpose, hurt small
businesses. 60
Representative Brooks, in fact, suggested that
government patents be "put up for competitive bid," allowing both big
business and small businesses the opportunity to obtain such patents.' 662'
The legislation was repeatedly called a $30 billion "giveaway."'
Senator Russell Long (Louisiana) testified that the public would have
no access to the results of the research it had paid for and would not
know whether products were being fairly priced. 163 He called the bill
"deleterious to the public interest."'" He further stated that there was
"absolutely no reason why the taxpayer should be forced to subsidize a
private monopoly and have to pay twice: first for the research and
development and then through monopoly prices.' 65
Representative Brooks criticized the use of march-in rights as the
primary mechanism for protecting the public interest:
"The
Government does not use its march-in rights one in a million times....
I think that is a paper tiger. I think we can forget [march-in rights] as a
realistic protection for the public.' ' 166 Brooks's statement proved
prophetic-the NIH has never exercised its march-in rights. 67 An
158. See generally 1980 House Gov't OperationsHearings,supranote 46, at 49-137

(statements of Hon. Jack Brooks, Hon. Frank Horton, Adm. H.G. Rickover, Hon. John D.
Dingell, and Ralph Nader).
159. Id. at 54.

160. Id. at 74-83 (statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover).
161. Id.at56.
162. See id. at 99 (testimony of Ky P. Ewing, Jr.); 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings,supra
note 46, at 401 (statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover); 1977 Senate Small Bus. Hearings,supra

note 46, at 233 (statement of Hon. Russell B. Long, U.S. Senator, La.).
163. See 1980JointHearing,supranote 151, at 463-65 (statement of Hon. Russell B.

Long).
164. Id. at 464.
165. Id.
166. See 1980 House Gov't OperationsHearings,supranote 153, at 55.

167. Not only has the NIH never exercised its march-in rights, but the only time it was
asked to do so by a private party, in the CelIPro litigation, it refused. See infra text
accompanying notes 294-313 There are some reports that "the NIH has on occasion
threatened to use 'march in' rights with some positive results." UnderreportingFederal
Involvement, supra note 105, at 101 (statement of Wendy Baldwin). However, there is no
record of any government agency ever actually exercising those rights.
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alternative was to create a Patent Board to exercise march-in rights,
the federal agency, another
rather than vesting that responsibility with
68
echoed.
have
debates
idea that current
A Department of Justice review of the pending legislation
highlighted the need for government patent policy to offer "adequate
protection of the public's equitable interest in inventions that result
1 69
from government funding," once the inventions are commercialized.
Early versions of the bill included a payback provision that was
supported, at least in principle, by most witnesses. 7° It required the
licensee to compensate the government for any profits from a
The bill would also have given the
successful invention.7
government 15% of any gross annual income above $70,000 that a
contractor obtained from licensing an invention. In addition, it also
would have granted the government 5% of all income above one
million dollars that the contractor made from sales of products using
Ultimately the legislation did not contain a
those inventions.
mechanism for ensuring a financial return on government investment.
However, it did preserve the "march-in" mechanism that would, if
enforced, effectively achieve the same goal of providing taxpayers
with some benefit: a requirement that the products of these inventions
be sold to the public at reasonable prices.174
B.

March-in andIts Focus on Competition,Profits,and Prices

Congress's concern with march-in rights focused exclusively on
maintaining competitive conditions, controlling profits, and doing so
through price control. The march-in provisions became the linchpin of
the entire enterprise because Congress wanted to balance the demands
of private industry against the "public equity" that resulted from the
massive public investment of funds to produce these patented
inventions. The so-called government equities were not adequately
protected by the government's "free and irrevocable license," which
was "not always sufficient to protect the public interest."1 75 This
168. See 1976 Hearings, supra note 157, at 785 (statement of William 0.
Quesenberry, Patent Counsel, Dep't of the Navy).

169. See 1980 House Gov't OperationsHearings,supranote 46, at 97 (testimony of
Ky P. Ewing, Jr.).
170. S. RP'. No. 96-480, at 8-10, 25-26 (1979).

171. Id. at9.
172. Id.

173. Id.
174. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 201(f), 203(1)(a) (1994).
1 SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC & INT'L SCIETIIC PLANNING & ANALYSIS OF THE
COaMM. ON Sc!. & TECH., 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON GovERNMENT

175.

HousE
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shortcoming was sometimes characterized as "the public's need for
competition in the marketplace," which could be protected only by
march-in rights. 7 6 There was a strong notion of public desert in the
hearing testimony. 177 Congress uniformly viewed march-in rights as

the mechanism (along with recoupment provisions) to protect the
public. 7 "If an invention is of actual commercial importance,"
testified Donald R. Dunner, representing the American Patent Law

market incentive for 'march-in'
Association, "there is actual and real
179

rights to protect the public interest.'
But there was strong industry resistance to any kind of
revocability or march-in provision, though noticeably less resistance to
recoupment or payment of royalties.80 "Revocability of a contractor's

patent rights is an area of considerable concern to many businessmen,"
said one witness.'

"It is not a good concept that government should

go into competition with private enterprise," voiced another. 18 2

,It is

not a proper function of government .... Under socialism, the
government owns the essential means of production .... Under
capitalism production and distribution is privately owned. We firmly
believe this is the best way. It is more efficient, [and] it provides us
PATENT POLICIES: THE OWNERSHIP OF INVENTIONS RESULTING FROM FEDERALLY FUNDED
RESEARCH AND DEvEIOPMENT I (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter BACKGROUND

MATERIAIS].
176. 1976 Hearings,supra note 157, at 666 (Report by Task Force No. I of Study
Group No. 6 of the Comm'n on Gov't Procurement on the Allocation of Rights to Inventions
Made in the Performance of Gov't Research and Dev. Contracts and Grants).
177. 1977 Senate Small Bus.Hearings,supranote 46, at 189-95 (statement of John H.
Shenefield, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice).
178. Id.
179. 1978 Hearings,supranote 131, at 597 (statement of Donald R. Dunner).
180. In fact, the legislative history indicates that the fact that royalties, cash payments,
or recoupments would simply be absorbed into the cost of federally funded inventions is at
least one reason why they were deleted from the Bayh-Dole Act. That lends support,
therefore, to the conclusion that the Act was concerned with price control, not just
reimbursement. It is also easier to understand why the pharmaceutical industry has favored
royalties-because their cost can simply be passed along to consumers. See S. REP. No. 96480, at 30 (1979) (showing that the original version of the Act included a "payback"
provision); Government Patent Policy Act of 1980: Hearing on H.R. 5715 Before the
Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. of the House Comm. on Sci. & Tech., 96th Cong. 79
(1980) (supplement to the testimony of Charles H. Herz, Gen. Counsel, Nat'l Sci. Found.)
(noting the National Science Foundation's opposition to the inclusion of the government
recoupment provision in the Act); 1979 GovernmentPatentPolicy Hearings,supranote 11,
at 22-23, 59 (statements of Donald R. Dunner and Edward J. Brenner, President, Ass'n for
the Advancement of Invention and Innovation) (objecting to the inclusion of the payback
provision in the legislation).
181. See 1976 Hearings,supra note 157, at 173 (statement of Charles S. Haughey,
Patent Counsel, Hughes Aircraft Co.).
182. See id.at 397 (statement of L. Lee Humphries in supplemental material submitted
by Charles S. Haughey).
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with more freedom."' 83 A third stated, "[I]ndustry does not like either
the concept of a revocable license or the 'march-in' rights, and views
them with great suspicion."' 84 A university representative testified, "I
have always been a little concerned with that provision frankly,
because it could be an arbitrary decision ....I would hope.., that an
appropriate hearing would be given.' ' 85 Another witness said that
march-in rights would effectively kill the bill: "I think that the whole
concept of march-in rights is a disincentive.... I think that [the bill]
would be much more likely to achieve its goals if the march-in rights
were deleted.' ' 186 Finally, there was resistance not only to march-in
rights but to the terms used to define the triggering events:
Any march-in rights should only be exercisable by the Government
after a full and complete hearing before an impartial arbitor based on
clear and convincing evidence and should be limited to requiring the
Contractor to grant non-exclusive licenses ....
March-in rights which
do not provide effective due process ... or extend beyond the granting
of non-exclusive licenses are highly objectionable and would serve as a
disincentive ....Likewise, the circumstances under which the rights
can be exercised must be precisely
defined and avoid such vague terms
87

as "welfare" and the like.

The language that so threatened industry was obviously the
requirement for "reasonable terms" in the Bayh-Dole Act and its
predecessor bills. The 1963 Kennedy Memorandum on patent policy
required "licensing on reasonable terms."' 88 The Nixon Patent Policy
Statement of 1971 tied march-in rights to whether an invention is
"being worked and ...its benefits are reasonably accessible to the
public."'8 9
An industry-sponsored alternative bill interestingly
embraced the language "reasonable terms and conditions" but required
'"resort to the Federal Courts by either the Contractor or members of
the public" in case of a dispute.'90 Notwithstanding these objections,
183. See id.
184. See id. at 435 (statement of James E. Denny, Assistant Gen. Counsel for Patents,
U.S. Energy Research & Dev. Admin.).
185. See 1978 Hearings,supra note 131, at 397 (testimony of Howard W. Bremer).
186. See 1980 Joint Hearing, supra note 151, at 523-24 (testimony of Robert B.
Benson, Dir., Patent Dep't, Allis-Chalmers Corp.).
187. IndustrialInnovationandPatentand CopyrightLaw Amendments: Hearingson
H.R. 6033, H.R. 6934, H.R. 3806, and H.R. 2414 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong. 161
(1980) (statement of Donald R. Dunner, President, Am. Patent Law Ass'n).
188. 1BACKGROUND MAmmA s, supra note 175, at 6.
189. See id. at 10, 14-16 (emphasis added).
190. See 1976 Hearings,supra note 157, at 103 (statement of Franz 0. Ohlson, Jr.,
Aerospace Indus. Ass'n of Arn., Inc.).
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existing agency regulations already defined the practical application to
91
require that the invention be "reasonably accessible to the public."'
In fact, from as far back as at least 1968, a government report had
urged march-in rights triggered by a failure to license the invention
"on reasonable terms." 92

While proposals for recoupment, repayment, or royalty
provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act were eventually abandoned (in fact,
industry has often suggested cash payment and royalties as an
alternative to price regulation 93), march-in rights were preserved, with
their requirement that practical application-defined as availability to
the public on "reasonable terms"-be achieved. 194 There was never

any doubt that this meant the control of profits, prices, and competitive
conditions. There are countless references in the legislative record to
the need to maintain competitive market conditions through the
exercise of march-in rights."95 One witness, summarizing the goals of
a uniform federal patent policy, asserted that a "primary object[] of
such a policy should be to ... insure that patent rights in such

inventions are not used for unfair, anticompetitive or suppressive
purposes."' 196 A Senator testified before a House subcommittee that
"[t]he policy should foster competition and prevent undue market
concentration."' 97 A Senate witness favored march-in "where the

contractor is misusing the invention to the detriment of competitive
market forces."'98 An Assistant Attorney General in the Antitrust
Division said, "'[M]arch in' provisions should help assure that the
exclusive rights ... does not disrupt competition in the
availability of199

marketplace."'

191. See id. at 256 (Armed Servs. Procurement Regulation 7-302.23(a) (1975)); id. at

971 (Appendix I, Attachment 2 to Letter of Frank A. Lukasik, describing proposed Dep't of
the Interior Regulations).
192. 2 BACKGROUND MATEIALS, supra note 175, at 196.
193. The FederalGovernment's Investment in New DrugResearch andDevelopment:
Are We Getting Our Money's Worth? HearingBefore the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 103d
Cong. 145-46 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Senate Investment Hearing] (statement of George B.
Rathmann, President & Chief Executive Officer, Icos Corp.).

194. See 1 BACKGROUND MATERIALS, supranote 175, at 6.
195. See 1993 Senate Investment Hearing,supra note 193, at 132-39 (statement of
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n).
196. 1979 Senate JudiciaryHearings,supra note 46, at 184 (testimony of Frederick

N. Andrews, Vice President for Research, Purdue Univ.).
197. 1979 Gov't Patent Policy Hearings, supra note 11, at 6 (statement of Hon.
Harrison H. Schmitt).

198. See 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings,supra note 46, at 150 (additional comments of
James E. Denny).

199. 1980 House Gov't OperationsHearings,supranote 46, at 102 (testimony of Ky
P. Ewing, Jr.).
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Profits and unfair profiteering were a key topic in the debate over
march-in rights. March-in rights were designed to prevent "windfall
profits," about which there was much discussion."' The Senate
committee overseeing the Bayh-Dole Act wrote inits Report, "The
agencies will have the power to exercise march-in-rights to insure that
no adverse effects result from retention of patent rights by these
contractors.... Although there is no evidence of 'windfall profits' ...
the existence of the pay back provision reassures the public ..... 2 1 A
witness testified, "The 'march-in' rights were developed to address
issues of windfall, suppression and detrimental effects ... to
One witness tried to reassure Congress, saying,
competition."20'
'Windfall profits' do not result from contractors' retaining title to
such inventions."20 3 Another said, "[T]he Government will prevent the
contractors from enjoying windfalls of commercial benefits from
One industry witness
,20"
inventions paid for by the Government ....
tried to dismiss the very notion of windfall profits: "I had something
in my statement about the windfall profits," he said, "which we hear
all the time, is [sic] bad. I think that's a very misleading thing. When
you look at what is accomplished if [an unused technology becomes]
successful[,] ...the rewards to the general public, the citizens, is [sic]
tremendous. They have something which they never had before."20 5
Beyond the concerns with competition and windfall profits,
pricing concerned Congress the most. If anything, march-in rights
would prevent owners of exclusive rights from gouging the public
through unregulated prices. One witness stated: "[T]here seems to be
little disagreement on the objectives of a good patent policy for
government procurement.... [A] policy is in the public interest if...
[i]t promotes efficiency in the economic system by providing the
consumer with the goods and services he requires at the lowest
2 6 One witness said an independent Board should
possible prices."
ensure that government inventions are "commercially available to
adequately fulfill market demands and at a reasonableprice.""°7 The
200. See, e.g., S. Rm.No. 96-480, at3O (1979).
201. Id.
202. 1979 Government Patent Policy Hearings,supra note 180, at 16 (statement of
James E. Denny).
203. Id. at 92 (statement of Edward . Brenner).
204. 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings, supra note 46, at 34 (statement of R. Tenney
Johnson).
205. 1980 JointHearing,supra note 15 1, at 524 (testimony of Robert B. Benson).

206. 1976Hearings,supranote 157, at 387 (emphasis added) (supplemental materials
submitted by Charles H. Haughey).
207. Id. at 785

(emphasis added) (supplemental materials of William 0.

Quesenberry).
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Board would decide if "commercial authorization" to others was
appropriate based on whether: "(1) Commercial utilization has lapsed;
(2) Market demands are not met; (3) Market price is unreasonable;or
'
(4) Royalty rate is unreasonable."208
One of the stars of the hearings
(he testified at virtually all of them) was Admiral Hyman G. Rickover,
who said that "[t]he public has been greatly overcharged for many
years [for] drags." 2' He was then questioned by Benjamin Gordon, a
consultant to the Committee on Small Business:
"When a
Government agency ... gives away patents resulting from
Government-financed research, ... it does not take any steps to insure
that the contractor does not charge exorbitantprices to the public?""10
Admiral Rickover responded, "That is correct."'
Mr. Gordon expressed palpable concern over pricing, saying,
"The patent, the whole idea of a patent is to restrict the use. If you
restrict the use, you can control the prices and the profits. 21 2 An
industry spokesperson was no less candid about the centrality of prices
in triggering march-in rights. He stated, "[I]f [a contractor] fails to
supply the market adequately at a fairprice, then there is reason for
requiring it to license both the background patents and the patents
stemming from the contract work."213 A centerpiece of the hearings
with respect to march-in rights and pricing was the story of a
contractor who had balked at the march-in provisions in an EPA
contract. 214 Patrick Iannotta, President of the contractor Ecolotrol,
Inc., recounted the events whereby the company did not receive a
patent waiver because it would not agree to an EPA demand that it
make the invention "available at terms reasonable under the
circumstances."2 " Iannotta stated:
[W]e as a small company were unable to obtain from the
Environmental Protection Agency the.., patent rights ....
...
One of the things that I'm not sure you're aware of is the primary
reason we turned down the EPA grant.... [W]e would have been

208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. 1977 Senate Small Bus. Hearings, supra note 46, at 3 (emphasis added)
(statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover).
210. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (statement of Benjamin Gordon, Consultant to the
Comm. on Small Bus.).
211. Id. (statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover).
212. Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (statement of Benjamin Gordon).
213. 1979 Government Patent Policy Hearings,supra note 11, at 48 (statement of
Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., Gen. Patent Counsel, Gen. Elec. Co.).
214. See id. at 209 (correspondence submitted by Patrick J. lannotta, President,
Ecolotrol, Inc.).
215. Id.
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forced to agree to a march-in rights clause which I thought was
confiscatory ....
... Now, the march-in provision was such that we had to make the
invention reasonably available, whatever that meant, at a reasonable
volume, whatever that meant....
... The problem is the Government says it shall be "reasonably
available." What is "reasonably available" today to one administrator
may be "unreasonably unavailable" to some other administrator ....
On the question of march-in rights, I don't have a particularly
difficult problem with the subject inventions. I think the key has to be
this: The small businessman or large businessman or whatever, has to
have an irrevocable license....
... The best argument ever given to me why I should not disagree
with subject inventions or march-in provision is that they are never
used. I 16said, if they are never used, then take them out of the
contract.
But even that sympathetic tale was not enough, perhaps because,

once more, Admiral Rickover's sharp tongue apparently convinced
Congress, or at least the Committee, that pricing was key. Admiral
Rickover asked if it were wise "to exercise monopoly rights over the
distribution, use, and pricing of the results for 17 years?""21 In

response, Senator Long rhetorically inquired, "Is this bill providing a
limitation on just how much the successful contractorcan charge the
public for what the public has already paid for? ... Is there any

limitation in this proposal as to how much he could charge the public
to have the benefit of what the public had already paid for when they

paid for the research?"2 " Some time later, Admiral Rickover was in
the House, dramatizing the importance of price control:
Imagine the public furor that would ensue if, under the terms of this
bill, a contractor... developed at public expense a major breakthrough
.... Is it proper for that company to be able to exercise monopoly
rights over the distribution, use, and pricing of the results for 17
216. Id. at 169-71 (statement of Patrick J. lannotta). Exhibits attached to lannotta's

testimony demonstrate that the issue was one of price. In a letter to the EPA, he had written,
"In this grant[,] E.P.A. has required us to accept agrossprofitbefore taxes of only 7-2%. We
can do almost as well in the bank.... [W]hat would trigger such patent clause
renegotiations[?] ... Domination of the industry? Five hundred million dollars in annual
sales?" Id. at 205 (correspondence submitted by Patrick J. lannotta).
217. 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings,supranote 46, at 389 (emphasis added) (statement of
Adm. H.G. Rickover).
218. Id. at 392 (emphasis added) (statement of Hon. Russell B. Long).
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years---mind you, where the Government has paid for it? I think
not....

... The bill provides that if a contractor who holds title to a
Government-financed invention fails to develop and promote it, or
creates a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the Government
can force widespread licensing or revoke the Contractor's patent or
license.2 19

Congress, of course, insisted on march-in rights, but it is just as
revealing to observe what Congress did not do. The price-control
mechanism of the Bayh-Dole Act lies in its definition of "practical
'
and Congress was urged to redefine that term to
application,"22
dispense with the price requirement.221 Peter F. McCloskey, President
of the Electronic Industry Association, stated that "[t]he definition of
'practical application' appears too stringent. We would suggest a
rewrite to indicate that 'application' means ... 'that the invention is
being worked or that its benefits are available to the public either on
reasonable terms or through reasonable licensing .... 9"222 The "or" is,
obviously, crucial. That Congress refused McCloskey's rewrite and
maintained a march-in provision that is triggered upon failure to work
andreasonable price is perhaps the most telling fact of all.
Judging from the relevant testimony, the reasonable pricing
requirement is an open secret, meaning that Congress acknowledges
its presence, but the government seldom enforces it. In the latest
congressional term, Representative Sanders offered an amendment to
an appropriations bill, H.R. 4577, that forbade the use of funds for
licensing government patents except in accord with the reasonable
pricing provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 209, the section of the Bayh-Dole
Act applicable to license, rather than title, transfers.2 23

The

congressional debate over the Sanders Amendment was explicitly
addressed to the existing reasonable pricing provisions and cited the
Bayh-Dole Act's requirement of "reasonable terms" time and again.224
In fact, the text of the amendment was quite explicit in citing,
parenthetically, the "reasonable terms" provisions:
219. 1980 House Gov't OperationsHearings,supra note 46, at 79 (emphasis added)
(statement of Adm. H.G. Rickover).
220. "The term 'practical application' means ... that the invention is being utilized

and that its benefits are... available to the public on reasonable terms." 35 U.S.C. § 201(f)
(1994) (emphasis added).
221. 1979 Senate Sci. Hearings, supra note 46, at 221 (statement of Peter F.
McCloskey).
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. 146 CONG. Rzc. H4291 (daily ed. June 13, 2000).
224. Id. at H4291-93.

HeinOnline -- 75 Tul. L. Rev. 666 2000-2001

2001]

ENFORCINGDRUG PRICE CONTROLS

667

None of the funds made available in this Act for the Department of

Health and. Human Services may be used to grant an exclusive or
partially exclusive license pursuant to chapter 18 of title 35, United
States Code, except in accordance with section 209 of such title
(relating to the availability
to the public of an invention and its benefits
225

on reasonable terms).
Actually, the debate was more in the nature of legislative theater, or
even circus, because there was no argument about the import of the
reasonable terms language.226 What was being debated was an
amendment that did not impose new requirements but instead simply
demanded that existing law be respected.227
VI. THE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIA, AND INDUSTRY

One of the complexities of assessing and, especially, policing the
equity of technology-transfer legislation in particular, and publicprivate combinations in general, is the substantial confusion over the
appropriate roles of government, academia, and industry. Conflicting
interests and clashing organizational cultures may complicate the
effective implementation of public-private combinations.
225. Id. at H4291.
226. Id. atH4291-93.
227. In making the following statement, Congressman Sanders did not even pretend
that what he was offering was anything different than what current law requires:
Our amendment requires that the NIH abide by current law and ensure that a
company that receives federally owned research or a federally owned drug provide
that product to the American public on reasonable terms. This is not a new
issue....
While a reasonable pricing clause is not the only device that will protect the
investment that American taxpayers have made in numerous profitable drugs, this
amendment makes clear that Congress will not stand by while NIH turns over
valuable research without some evaluation that thepricecharged to consumers will
be reasonable as is requiredby current law.
Id. at H4291-92 (emphasis added). Despite this, news reports the following day held this to
be a departure from existing law. For instance, the New York Times, in its report, implied that
the provisions of the Sanders Amendment would require new legislation, rather than
enforcement of the existing Bayh-Dole statute:
In another demonstration of the significance of the issue to lawmakers, the
House today overwhelmingly passed legislation offered by Representative Bernard
Sanders, a Vermont Independent, that would require "reasonable pricing" on drugs
developed through collaboration between the National Institutes of Health and
pharmaceutical companies.
The legislation, a response to charges that drug companies are overcharging
patients for drugs developed in part with federal money, does not establish a
specific formula for pricing the drugs. But is it intended to lower some drug
prices. Its prospects in the Senate are unclear.
Robert Pear, In Policy Change,House Republicans CallforGovernment GuaranteeofDrug
Benefits, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14, 2000, at A25.
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Historically, universities have placed greater emphasis on basic
science and the pursuit of knowledge than on the practical application
of scientific discoveries.22 However, from the 1920s through the early
229
1940s, cooperation between academia and industry began to grow,
despite the disdainful view that many academics had of faculty
members who collaborated with industry? 0o This disdain began to
dissipate as academic inventors themselves sought to commercialize
their research by seeking patents and licenses for university research
results, beginning on a large scale with the establishment of the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation in 1925.I
The Bayh-Dole Act has undoubtedly spurred these collaborative
activities between universities and private enterprises. Since the
1980s, there has been a dramatic increase in collaborations between
academic scientists, who still receive a substantial portion of their
funding from the government, and industry.232 This reflects a
slowdown in the growth of federal support for health-related research,
which has been caused by national policy shifts and the growth in
universities' commitments to commercialize their own research
themselves. 3 Increasingly, universities have started their own forprofit companies. In one notable case, a university, along with its
individual members of the Board of Trustees, the university president,
and members of the faculty, owned equity in a company.234 According
to one recent study of 800 biotechnology faculty members at forty
research universities, 47% consulted with industry, nearly 25%
received industry-supported grants and contracts, and 8% owned
equity in a company whose products were related to their research.235
Perhaps more troubling was the finding that 30% of those with
industry funding said that their choice of research topics was

228. Sheldon Krimsky, University Entrepreneurship and the Public Purpose, in
COMM. ON ScIENTIc FREEDOM & RESPONSIBILITY, AM.

Assoc. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT

OF

Sci., BIOTECHNOLOGY: PROFESSIONAL ISSUES AND SOCIAL CONCERNS 35 (P. DeForest et al.
eds., 1998).
229. JOHN P. SwVANN, ACADEMIc ScIENTISTS AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY:
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH INTWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 170 (1988).
230. Id. at 24,30-35.
231. David Blumenthal et al., Commercializing UniversityResearch, 314 NEv ENG. J.
MED. 1621, 1621-26 (1986).
232. Udayan Gupta, Hungryfor Funds, Universities Embrace Technology Transfer,
WALL ST. J., July 1, 1994, atAl.
233. See id.
234. See David Blumenthal, Academic-Industry Relationships in the Life Sciences:
Extent, Consequences,and Management,268 JAMA 3344, 3346 (1992).

235. See id. at 3345.
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influenced by their perceived commercial potential; only 7% of those
without industry support were likewise influenced.
In a survey of thirty-five universities with the largest grants from
the NIH and the National Science Foundation (NSF), the GAO found

that thirty-four had technology licensing offices; by contrast, only
twenty-two had established such offices before 1980.236 During fiscal
years 1989 and 1990, technologies developed with acknowledged237
NIH or NSF funding accounted for approximately 73% of all license
238

income.

At many universities, private corporations can gain access to
federally funded technologies through membership in industrial liaison
programs (ILPs).2 9 For an annual fee, corporate members are able to
attend research symposia and seminars and receive research reports,
abstracts, and newsletters. This fee also buys corporate members
virtually unrestricted access to faculty research prior to publication,
usually through interactions or consultations with university faculty.
In the GAO study mentioned above, thirty universities out of thirtyfive surveyed had such a program.24 °

Many ILPs offer membership to foreign companies. Twenty-four
241

of the thirty-five ILPs examined had at least one foreign member,

which raises questions about the appropriateness of transferring U.S.
taxpayer-funded technology to foreign countries.242

For example,

236. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTmG OFFIcE, GAO/RCED-92-104, University Research:
Controlling Inappropriate Access to Federally Funded Research Results 11 (1992)
[hereinafter GAO UNrvarrY REsEARCH REPORT].
237. As we have already stated, one of the most daunting tasks is to discover the true
numbers, largely because the reported numbers depend upon self-reporting. There is a
difference between whether technology is the product of federal funding, in whole or in part,
and whether an academic institution (or government agency) believes it is. Because, in the
case of academic institutions and businesses that may benefit from federally funded research,
the decision to characterize technology as publicly supported or not carries with it the
decision to recognize public rights, including most especially, the reasonable-pricing clause
of the Bayh-Dole Act, the conflict of interest involved in such a decision makes the results of
such self-reporting suspect by definition. See, e.g., Gosselin & Jacobs, supra note 20
(claiming that DNA research was partially funded by the federal government despite the
inventors' protestations to the contrary); NAT'L INSrS. OF HEALTH, OFFiCE OF THE Di.,
DmmNATION iN RE PE=TION OF CELLPRO, INC., available at http:llwww.nih.gov/news/
pr/aug97/nihb-0l.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2001) [hereinafter CELLPRo DETERMINATION]
(determining whether to exercise march-in rights against holders of a government-funded
patent).
238. GAO UNIvRsrrY RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 236, at 12.
239. Id. at 17.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Nevertheless, note that this question is also separate and apart from the

applicability of the Bayh-Dole Act. The Act makes no distinction between foreign and
domestic patentees, and, to the extent that foreign enterprises obtain patents granted by the
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approximately 50% of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's
(MIT) corporate ILP members were foreign, and, together, they have
early access to the results of 86% of MIT's $500 million of federal
research support.243 While the return to U.S. taxpayers is questionable,
university researchers can earn generous returns in the form of
royalties and other incentives for collaboration. 2"
Whether information gained through access to federally funded
research is subject to the restrictions of the Bayh-Dole Act, especially
its reasonable-pricing requirements, seems an almost unanswerable
question. The answer, however, is hardly daunting: To the extent that
the language of the Act covers the research, patents gained through
that research must bear the Bayh-Dole legend, as well as be subject to
the price-control and other requirements. To the extent that such
patents fail to bear the legend, their owners are clearly misleading the
public about its rights.
Whether the lack of return to U.S. taxpayers is troubling depends
on how one characterizes the missions of government, academia, and
industry. Despite the fact that private industry would never tolerate a
relationship in which the benefits of a particular investment would be
limited to the ambiguous notion of an unaudited and vaguely defined
return, an analogous argument is often proposed to justify similar
public benefits from taxpayer-funded research. This argument
proposes that research subsidized with public funds, whether funneled
through industry, academia, or a combination of the two, repays
taxpayers through the marketing of new products. This view is held
by NIH leaders, who are more concerned with developing and
commercializing inventions than with ensuring that the government is
repaid for its investment or controlling the price at which new
technologies are sold.245 Of course, the NIH's position is at odds with
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the underlying innovations of which are due to federal
funding consistent with the Bayh-Dole Act, those patents demand the Bayh-Dole legend as
well. Thus, the question of the appropriateness of foreign benefits based on U.S. taxpayersupported research is simply heightened when those patents escape Bayh-Dole oversight, and
the situation is doubly inappropriate.
243. H.R. REP. No. 102-1052, at 7 (1992).
244. Seeid. at9-11.
245. One report noted:
The National Institutes of Health is not equipped, either by its expertise or by its
legislative mandate, to analyze private sector product pricing decisions, NIH
Director Bernadine Healy said Feb. 24.
... Healy said that NIH can contribute to assessments of pricing by
providing "expert technical advice and the relative merits of various products, as
well as the difficulty of the discovery by informing policymakers and potential
regulators of the cost of NIH's role in the co-development of such products."
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the Bayh-Dole Act, which is not satisfied with an unaudited return, but
demands that the public receive a demonstrable and valuable benefit
by restricting pricing to levels that are reasonable.
Not surprisingly, many in industry agree with the ephemeral
return argument, asserting that government's role is merely to serve as
the catalyst for useful, marketable inventions. As the head of one
biotech company stated:
The purpose of government basic research is not simply to provide
employment for scientists... [but] ... also to conduct research that can
improve our standard of living, improve our health and welfare, and
improve the competitiveness of U.S. firms. The bottom line in which
these objectives
are measured is in the market place, not just in the
246
laboratory.
It is true that government and academic researchers typically
emphasize longer-term, basic research, which is a markedly different
emphasis than industry's short-term, market-driven aims. The conflict
between socially and commercially valuable goals goes to the heart of
the concerns regarding public-private combinations. For instance, the
virtual absence of anti-addiction medications-only two such
treatments have been marketed in the last thirty years-illustrates the
possible result.247 The Medications Development Division of the
National Institute on Drug Abuse is intended to be a catalyst for
private sector R&D, which it prefers to conduct through CRADAs.248
Despite an estimated three million people with opiate and cocaine
addictions in the United States, only two anti-addiction CRADAs have
been established with industry.2 49

However, for the NIH to undertake pricing analyses or regulation "would
radically change its fundamental nature, potentially undermine its research
mission, and place it squarely in conflict with its technology transfer
responsibilities," according to Healy.
Drugs: NIH Said Not Equippedto Analyze PricingDecisionsofPrivate Firms, DAILY REP.
FOR EXECuTIVES (BNA) No. 9 (Feb. 25, 1993) [hereinafterNIHNot Equipped];see also infra
notes 294-313 and accompanying text (discussing the CellPro litigation).
246. The Bayh-Dole Act, A Review of Patent Issues in FederallyFunded Research:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Patents,Copyrights & Trademarks ofthe S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 93 (1994) (statement of Barbara Conta, Dir., Regeneron Pharm.

Corp.).

247.

INST. OF MED., THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICATIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF

OPIATE AND COCAINE ADDICTIONS:

ISSUES FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR I

(Carolyn E. Fulco et al. eds., 1995).

248. Seeid. at 80-81.
249. Id. at 81.
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VII. CONFLICTSOF INTEREST

A conflict exists between the purported objectivity of science and
the potential bias introduced by commercial interests.2 0 At a
theoretical level, Henry Etzkowitz argues that the increasingly strong
ties between science and industry are not in conflict with legitimate
scientific goals; rather, they represent the emergence of new norms
about the proper conduct of science? ' Etzkowitz believes that
internal pressures from reduced federal funding have driven the rise of
entrepreneurial science, while externally, technology-transfer
legislation has encouraged university researchers to view their work in
new, economically relevant ways.252 Nonetheless, the new model
raises concerns about conflicts of interest. For example, a tension
exists between the academic and governmental mandate to publish
research results rapidly in order to disseminate knowledge and the
commercial pressures on industry to keep research confidential.253
This is especially troubling in areas of basic research.
A GAO report acknowledges that the problems surrounding the
flow of information between governmental, industrial, and academic
partners can be problematic: "[T]he public interest is better served if
the Government ensures that appropriate controls and safeguards are
in place governing who gets the access to, and ultimately will benefit
from, the results of federally funded research."254 One concern is that,
in the rush to patent, powerful research tools may become inaccessible
to the research community 5
Another study revealed serious
concerns about the free flow of information among biomedical faculty
at leading universities due to their allegiances to so many competing
companies 6 The Bayh-Dole Act allows federal agencies to prohibit
public disclosure of an invention for "a reasonable time in order for a
250. Robert K. Merton, A Note on Science and Democracy, 1 J. LEGAL & POL. SCI.
115, 115-26 (1942).
251. See Henry Etzkowitz, EntrepreneurialScience in the Academy: A Case of the
TransformationofNorms, 36 SoC. PROBS. 14 (1989).
252. Id. at 17.
253. Id.

254. Conflict ofInterest,Protection ofPublicOwnership, in DrugDevelopment Deals
Between Tax-Exempt, FederallySupportedLabs and the PharmaceuticalIndustry: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Bus. Opportunities,& Tech. of the House Comm. on
Small Bus., 103d Cong. 40 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Conflict ofInterestHearing](testimony
of Jim Wells, Assoc. Dir., Energy & Sci. Issues, Res., Cmty., & Econ. Dev. Div., U.S. Gen.
Accounting Office).
255. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PANEL REPORT OF THE FORuM ON SPONSORED
RESEARCH AGREEMENTs: PERSPECTIVEs, OuTLOOK, AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 3 (1994).

256. See Sheldon Krimsky et al., Academic-Corporate Ties in Biotechnology: A
QuantitativeStudy, 16 Sci., TECH., & HUMAN VALUES 275, 275-287 (1991).
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patent application to be fi1ed."'
This precludes other fields from
benefiting until the patent is filed.
The NIH has had a difficult time enacting conflict of interest
guidelines for its fund recipients. Guidelines developed in 1989,
which specifically prohibited researchers from holding equity options
in companies that could be affected by their research outcome, were
criticized as too restrictive and were withdrawn.258 The NIH
Revitalization Act required the NIH to issue clear guidelines in 1993,
but the NIH declined to comply with a congressional requirement that
it define the "specific circumstances that constitute" a financial
conflict of interest.259 When the NIH issued draft guidelines in 1993, it
required only that universities and other institutions form three-person
committees to decide when financial ties created a conflict or
compromised HHS research." ° That suggestion was abandoned,
however, in favor of "institutional official(s)," whose job is "to solicit
and review financial disclosure statements from each Investigator who
is planning to participate in PHS-funded research."2' ' The obligation
' to
of the institution is simply to take undefined "reasonable steps"26
assure compliance with the institution's rules and the regulations,
which essentially require disclosure and nothing more.263
Another potential conflict exists between the possibility of future
royalties and scientists' accurate interpretation of their research. The
FTTA, which allows government inventors to retain 15% of the
royalty income that an agency receives from an invention, addresses
this issue.2 While royalties are certainly a potent incentive, they do
not differ appreciably from equity positions or other financial
relationships that the NIH has sought to prohibit among its extramural
researchers. The possibility of future royalties may compromise a
researcher's conduct, interpretation, or representation of research.
Whether a 15% stake in royalty income would be enough to induce
such a compromise depends in part on the individual inventor and the
invention's commercial potential.

257. 35 U.S.C.A. § 205 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000).
258. See Michael D. Witt & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Conflict of Interest Dilemmas in
BiomedicalResearch,271 JAMA 547,548 (1994).
259. Bruce Agnew, CongressDemandsFinalConflict-of-InterestRegulations,J. NIH
REs., Aug. 1993, at 48, 48.
260. See id.
261. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604(b) (2000).

262. Id. § 50.604(a).
263. Id. § 50.604(c)(2).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 3710c(a)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
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Another conflict of interest exists with respect to what is
essentially the self-reporting arrangement by which federally funded
institutions decide whether inventions are the product of federal
funding and whether such inventions should bear the Bayh-Dole
legend. These are two separate questions, of course. Apart from the
clear temptation to err on the side of nondisclosure, note that the latter
issue is somewhat more complex than whether the invention is a
product of federal funding.26 Because the system is one of selfreporting, there is no reason to believe-except for pure faith, of
course-that, where millions of dollars are at stake, 2" such
institutions, even when they understand that the legend is required,
will decide to adopt the legend, especially knowing that there is no
meaningful penalty for failure to do so.
VIIL FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND AND ASSERT MARCH-IN RIGHTS
Because patents are obtained in secret, there is no way to know
whether recipients have acknowledged the government's support and
its rights to the invention, as required by law, until after the patent is
granted. Yet the regulations adopted by the government soon after the
Bayh-Dole Act's enactment established that, if the appropriate legend
were discovered to be missing, the government's right to march-in
could only be invoked if asserted within sixty days after the discovery

265. See supranotes 133-145 and accompanying text.
266. A recent GAO report reveals the startlingly large sums involved: The University
of California received $63,000,000 annuallyin licensing fees based on more than one billion
dollars of annual federal funding; Stanford received $43,000,000 annually; Columbia,
$40,000,000; Michigan State, $17,000,000; the University of Wisconsin at Madison,
$13,000,000. All told, universities polled in the GAO report received $208,000,000 in 1996
for licensing. ADMINSrRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE AC, supranote 2, at 10. How likely is it
that those institutions that have their own constituencies, especially those that frequently
complain of underfunding, as universities often do, will willingly put these kinds of funds at
risk for federal appropriation? Consider this recent news item:
Universities also have become adept at tapping... health-related royalties, which
totaled roughly $300 million in 1996, almost triple the 1991 level.
Profits on drugs that emerge from university labs offer the biggest potential
for the federal government to get a return on its research investment. However, it
would also raise the hackles of the education lobby, which would fight to keep
university royalties flowing undiluted by any federal cut.
"At a time when academic medical centers are struggling from Medicare
and Medicaid cutbacks, trying to tax another small revenue stream they may get
from royalties doesn't make any sense to me," says David Kom, a senior vice
president at the Association of American Medical Colleges.
Chris Adams & Gardiner Harris, When NIHHelps DiscoverDrugs, Should Taxpayers Share
Wealth?, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2000, at B1.
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Both the
of the contractor's failure to disclose the invention.26
government and the funded entities admit that the Act has not been
policed and, at the same time, offer varied excuses for that neglect,
which range from the impossibility of proving that an invention was

funding
really conceived while the project was receiving government
26
to the limited time available to unearth such proof

Effectively, the government has enacted a statute of limitations
against itself that makes enforcement of the Act impossible and
abrogates all public rights to Bayh-Dole patents. With only two
people at the NIH charged with handling invention information
coming from thousands of funding agreements awarded each year, 269 it

is virtually impossible to discover and notify all, or even most,
violators of the Act within sixty days. While the NIH has

implemented a computerized system for handling invention
information in response to an investigation by its Inspector General,
267. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (1994); 37 C.F.R. § 401.3(a) (2000). Together, these rules
require that standard patent rights clauses be part of every subject funding arrangement.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 401.14, the following legend has to be included in any patent subject
to the regulations: "This invention was made with government support under (identify the
contract)awarded by (identify the Federal agency). The government has certain rights in the
invention." 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(f)(4) (2000) (internal quotations omitted). However, if a
contractor obtains a patent without including the legend in the patent, the government must
(1) discover this failure and (2) attempt to regain title to the invention. The government has
compounded the difficulty of its task by including in its regulations the requirement that:
"the agency may only request title within 60 days after learning of the failure of the
contractorto disclose or elect within the specified times." Id. § 401.14 (d)(1). What makes
this even more troublesome is that the regulations do not specify whether the government
must actually be aware of the absence of the legend or whether "constructive knowledge"
will suffice. Because patents are a matter of public record, one of the first arguments an
errant contractor can be expected to make is that the government constructively knows of
each issued patent and, thus, the sixty-day period has passed.

268. Universities, for example, admitted that they had some difficulty complying with
Bayh-Dole's reporting requirement:

Each of the universities visited had systems that allowed them to track dates and
meet reporting deadlines for all Bayh-Dole requirements. However, some
university officials noted that determining compliance with certain requirements
can be difficult. For example, as noted above, it may be difficult to tell when an
invention actually was conceived or when the university first learned of it.
University officials told us that, as a practical matter, it may not be possible to
know whether an invention exists until there is at least a preliminary patent search.
Thus, how to meet the requirement in the regulations to report an invention within
2 months is unclear.
ADMINSTRATION OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACr, supranote 2, at 12-13. Note that the government,
the universities, or both have failed, once again, to understand the terms of the Act. The two

month period is the period in which the government, not the university, is required to act in
order to take title to inventions that are not properly reported.
269. OFFicE OF INSPECrOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH &HumAN SERvs., NIH OVERsIGHr
OF EXTRAiURAL RESEARCH INVENTIONS 3 (1994) [hereinafter NIH OvERsIGHT OF
EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH].
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budget pressures preclude the agency from hiring additional staff for
these activities.2 70 To make matters worse, the NIH would have to
conduct thousands of investigations every year in order to discover
legend omissions. In order to police this kind of '"egative" violation,
the NIH would have to audit every patent granted to contractors or
anyone operating with their authority. This additional procedure
would amount to more than 100,000 investigations annually.27'
Finally, the NIH has abdicated its responsibility by announcing that it
has no interest in enforcing these provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act and
by operating what has been referred to as a "lackadaisical" "honor
272
system" with "a policy of 'don't ask, don't tell and don't pursue."'

Enforcement of the Bayh-Dole Act is further weakened because
of the astonishing and virtually unbelievable fact that the government
does not understand, let alone acknowledge, the nature of its march-in
rights. To a large extent, government agencies, when addressing
march-in rights, confuse them with a simple utilization or working
requirement. 273 This failure to understand the full impact of the Bayh270. Telephone interview with Sue Ohata, Nat'l Insts. of Health, Dir., Div. of
Extramural Invention Reports (May 15, 1995).
271. Over 100,000 new patents are issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
annually. Morton Int'l Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Mayer, J., concurring). A search of the patents issued by the office between Jan. 1, 1999,
and Jan. 1,2000, for instance, reveals that there were 154,485 patents issued; this number is,
unsurprisingly, increasing. The figure for a similar period between 1994 and 1995 was only
102,230. And this does not include patents issued abroad that are also subject to the BayhDole rules. For instance, the European Patent Office, just one part, though a substantial one,
of the international patent regime, issues about 24,000 new patents annually out of
approximately 126,000 new applications each year. Samson Helfgott, Super2P GroupNews,
18 INrnr.. PROP. L. NavsL 32, 34 (2000); David W. Okey, Constitutionalityof a MultiNationalPatentSystem, PartIf,81 J. PAT. & TRADmARK OFF. Soc'Y 927, 959 n.144 (1999).
The point of all this, however, is not to show how daunting a task it would be to police this
effectively. Instead, these numbers send the clear message to contractors that they can ignore
or violate the Bayh-Dole Act with effective impunity. Note that, since the Scripps-Sandoz
deal came under scrutiny in 1993, the NIH has again investigated contractors and discovered
similarly large and grave violations of the Bayh-Dole Act, with no explanations offered by
the contractors. U.S. GEN. ACCOUmIG OFFCE, GAO/RCED-99-242, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER:

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERALLY SPONSORED INVENTIONS NEED

REvON 2 (1999) [hereinafter REPORTING REQumEENTS].

272. UnderreportingFederalInvolvement, supra note 105, at 2 (statement of Hon.
Ron Wyden, U.S. Congressman, Or.); see also Mark Z. Barabak, U.S. MayBe Losing Out on
Medical Research, SAN Dmio UIoN-TRmUNE, July 12, 1994, at C1 (reporting on the
widespread noncompliance with the Bayh-Dole Act among research universities and quoting
Congressman Wyden).
273. In one of the most recent government reports on the administration of the BayhDole Act, the GAO committed the fatal error of confusing march-in rights with simple
working requirements without regard to pricing or the other guarantees of public benefit
which were supposed to be the raison d'etre of the Act. Describing universities' obligations
under the Bayh-Dole Act, the report erroneously states, "The university must attempt to
develop the invention. Otherwise, the government retains the right to take control of the
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Dole Act, and certainly its most profound element-a reasonable
pricing requirement extending broadly across all inventions that are
produced as a result of federal funding (including pharmaceuticals)means that even minimal oversight has no significance.274 The GAO
recently reported massive violations of the Bayh-Dole Act. 275
However, because it failed to understand the true breadth of march-in
rights-that is, of reasonable pricing requirements-it failed to
understand the import of those violations. The report simply noted
that, absent responsible reporting by contractors, the government
would lose its right to work those inventions itself.276 But because
there is no real possibility that the government would work any of
those inventions, the failure to report was, at best, interesting trivia.
Had the GAO reported that the public has lost its right to require
priced drugs, such a report would have had a meaningful
reasonably
7
27

impact.

The GAO's ignorance of march-in rights is not the end of the
story, because, as it turns out, contractors, including universities, are
engaging in regular, recurring, and unexplained violations of the
Act.2 78 The most serious violation is the complete failure to report the
patents that they obtain due to government funding.279 This failure
manifests itself most immediately in patents that do not bear the BayhDole legend. Obviously, without serious and expensive investigation
invention." ADMNmISTRATON OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT, supranote 2, at 4. But, of course, the
requirement is not that the university simply "develop" the invention; the responsibility of the
university, or of any contractor subject to the Act,is to ensure that the invention is priced
reasonably. The failure of contractors to do so is surely outweighed, on the scale of what
might be acceptable, by the government's utter failure to understand its responsibility to
police the Act properly and knowingly.
274. See 35 U.S.C. § 201(b)-(c),(e) (1994) (defining the terms "funding agreement,"
"contractor," and "subject invention," respectively).
275. REPORTiNG REQuIEM , supranote 271, at 6.

276. Id. at 15-19.
277. This is how the government reported violations of the Bayh-Dole Act:
Federal agencies and their contractors and grantees are not complying with
provisions on the disclosure, reporting, retention, and licensing of federally
sponsored inventions under the regulations implementing the Bayh-Dole Act and
Executive Order 12591. In our review of more than 2,000 patents issued in
calendar year 1997 as well as an Inspector General's draft report on 12 large
grantees of the National Institutes of Health, we found that the databases for
recording the government's royalty-free licenses are inaccurate, incomplete, and
inconsistent and that some inventions are not being recorded at all. As a result, the
government is not alvays aware of federally sponsored inventions to which it has
royalty-free rights.
Id. at 2.
278. Id. at 6.
279. Id. at 10-12.
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of each and every government contractor (or worse, their undisclosed
transferees), there is no way the government can discover inventions
that were patented without its knowledge. As a recent report found:
InJuly 1999, the Inspector General submitted a draft report to NIH on
the most recent review and concluded that compliance with Bayh-Dole
requirements remained insufficient. The Inspector General found that,
of 633 medically related patents issued to the 12 grantees in calendar
year 1997, 490 were recorded in Edison. The remaining 143 patents
were not in Edison, and the patents did not include government interest
statements. After comparing the information in the 143 patents with
information from NIH's grant records, the Inspector General concluded
that all 143 inventions most likely resulted from NIH-sponsored
research and questioned the 12 grantees about these findings. The
grantees then reviewed their records and agreed that 79, or 55.2 percent,
of the 143 inventions were in fact supported with NIH's funding. The
grantees also acknowledged that they had not properly notified NIH of
the inventions or included a statement on their patent applications that
the inventions had been created with federal support. They did not
agree that the remaining 64 patents resulted from governmentsponsored research.280
The failure to include the legend is a kind of insurance against
discovery and, without mincing words, amounts to theft of
government property and ongoing fraud of massive proportions. The
GAO figure--143 unreported medically related patents out of a total
of 633 such patents-yields a failure rate of about 25%, and, of course,
this is a rate that the GAO has discovered without the kind of intensive
investigation necessary to uncover the true dimensions of the fraud.28'
Even the contractors' admission of 79 unreported inventions out of
633 yields a 13% failure rate.282 Equally shocking is the GAO's
conclusion that contractors fail to comply with the Bayh-Dole Act's
general reporting requirements (that is, the required combination of
both the Bayh-Dole legend and a confirmatory government license
statement) at a rate of94%!2831 In what seems to be a typical situation,
the GAO visited ten government contractors and examined the patents
obtained by those contractors without regard to government
funding. 284 The GAO found that these contractors typically failed to
280. Id. at 12-13.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 13.
283. Id. at 6 ("[W]hile 2,083 patents issued in 1997 had either a government interest
statement or a confirmatory license on file, only 128, or 6.1 percent, were recorded in both
databases.').
284. Id. at 1-2, 6-7, 12,27.

HeinOnline -- 75 Tul. L. Rev. 678 2000-2001

2001]

ENFORCINGDRUG PRICE CONTROLS

679

report about 20% of the patents issued to them, even though they were
subject to the Bayh-Dole Act reporting requirements. 21 What is again

shocking is that, when confronted with this evidence, none of the
contractors were able or willing to explain why they failed to take
that they were in wrongful possession of
steps necessary to reveal
286
government property.

Although the recent GAO and other reports on the Bayh-Dole
Act indicate some continuing governmental interest in the indifference
that contractors have demonstrated toward their responsibilities under
the Act, little has been done. This is surely due to the fact that even
the GAO fails to understand exactly what it is investigating. It seems
thoroughly obvious that the most serious consequence of a failure to
report the government interest in granted patents is that the
government will not be able to police the pricing of inventions for
which the public has already paid. With that at stake, the GAO's
interest in discovering individual and systematic failures to comply

should be high and its investigations well motivated. But the GAO
does not understand the stakes; instead, the GAO itself has stated that
the failure to report means that the government is unable to exercise its

royalty-free license when contractors do not comply, even though, in
the same breath, the GAO notes that such a license is rarely used.287
285. Id. at 12. Specifically, the GAO found that:
During visits to 10 contractors and grantees, we asked the contractors and
grantees whether there might be federally sponsored inventions that had not been
reported at all. In this regard, we reviewed other patents that were issued to them
during calendar year 1997 that did not contain government interest statements and
for which no confirmatory licenses were on file at PTO. In each case, we asked
contractor or grantee officials to show us from the records available how they
determined that the inventions were not the result of government funding.
Our review of 56 patents showed that 11, or 19.6 percent, of the 56
inventions in question had not been reported even though the inventions appeared
to have been the result of government funding. Officials from the five contractors
and grantees responsible for these I1 patents agreed with our findings but did not
explain why the inventions had not been reported. Again, each had systems
designed to ensure that all government-sponsored inventions were disclosed.
Id.
286. Id. It is tempting to be more sanguine and charitable and characterize this simply
as a "failure to comply" or, as the GAO put it, "inventions [that] had not been reported." Id.
But the Bayh-Dole Act march-in rights are, as is true of many fights, a type of property, and
what can be phrased as a "failure to comply" is, in reality, wrongful possession of property.
This is, at the very least, a kind of conversion.
287. Id. at 2 ("As a result [of widespread Bayh-Dole noncompliance], the government
is not always aware of federally sponsored inventions to which it has royalty-free rights.').
In a concluding section of its most recent review of the Bayh-Dole Act, entitled "The Primary
Use of a License Is for Research and Infringement Protection," the GAO reports,
No government wide data exist on how the government actually uses its royaltyfree licenses, and agencies did not have records showing how often and under what
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With so little apparently at stake in the GAO's mind, it is no wonder
that the Bayh-Dole Act is not enforced. It seems clear, then, that the
Bayh-Dole Act will never be enforced until the true nature of march-in
rights are understood and the price-control rights vested in the
government are recognized.
As an example of the government's continuing confusion and
ignorance regarding the price-control provisions of the Bayh-Dole
Act, consider that in its most recent report, the GAO accurately
identified some fatal flaws of the administration of the Bayh-Dole Act
but omitted discussion of the price-control provision.288 In doing so,
the GAO utterly failed to identify the most devastating consequence of
noncompliance with the Bayh-Dole Act, the absence of price controls,
believing instead that the true loss suffered by the public was the
underutilization of royalty-free government licenses. As the GAO
concluded:
Federal agencies are not sufficiently aware of the royalty-free rights the
government has to inventions subject to the Bayh-Dole Act and
Executive Order 12591. This is because the two primary resources for
information on federally sponsored inventions-the Government
Register and the patent database-are inaccurate, incomplete, and
inconsistent. These errors and omissions are the result of federal
funding agencies', contractors', and grantees' not always complying
with reporting
requirements that are themselves often complicated and
2 89
redundant.

Clearly, the GAO is wrong. It is not that the government is "not
sufficiently aware of the royalty-free rights [that it] has" but that the
government is not at all aware of its price-control authority.29
The GAO has misread the Bayh-Dole Act on more than one
occasion. In a 1998 review of Bayh-Dole and university research, the
circumstances these licenses have been employed. Agency officials told us,
however, that they value the royalty-free licenses because they allow the
government to use the inventions without concern about possible challenges that
the use was unauthorized. The agency officials also noted that, while the
government can use its royalty-free licenses to reduce procurement costs in those
cases in which royalties are disclosed as a cost element in the contract, such cases
seldom occur.
Id. at 17.
288. Id. at 19 (failing to recognize the government's inability to control prices under
the current Bayh-Dole administration).
289. Id.
290. Clearly, the GAO has failed to incorporate into its understanding of march-in
rights the notion that "practical application," as defined in the statute, requires public
availability upon reasonable terms---not simply public availability. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f)
(1994).
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GAO described, or, more accurately, misdescribed, the nature of
march-in rights:
The university must attempt to develop the invention. Otherwise, the
government retains the right to take control of the invention. The
government also may take control of the invention for other reasons,
such as a need to alleviate health or safety concerns. This provision is
referred to in the law as the government's "march-in" rights.91
But, of course, this is the same error compounded. The university, or
any federally funded contractor subject to the Bayh-Dole Act (which
was extended to large businesses in many cases by Executive Order
12,591)292 is required to do far more than "develop" the invention. By
the terms of the Act, the contractor must take steps to ensure that the
invention is made available to the public at a reasonable price, and,
one may assume, at other reasonable terms, to the extent that those
terms are in some way important.293
The GAO is not alone in its failure to understand and recognize
the price-control mechanism inherent in Bayh-Dole march-in rights.
In the only known case in which march-in rights were demanded, the
government and commentators together failed to fully grasp the notion
of march-in rights.294 In 1994, Johns Hopkins University and others
sued CelPro for the infingement of patents that had been funded by
296
the NIH.295 In 1997, a jury found CellPro liable for infringement.
CelPro then petitioned the NIH to institute march-in procedures
against the patent owners, seeking an order that would require Johns
Hopkins to license CelPro to use the patent "on reasonable terms" or,
alternatively, to have the NIH issue a license directly to CellPro so that
it could work the patent.297 CellPro apparently asserted that this was
necessary because of health or safety needs or, alternatively, because
Johns Hopkins had failed to achieve "practical application."298
Actually, it is not clear whether CeUPro made this exact allegation,
which would have been proper under the statute, because the NIH, in
its determination, stated that CelPro had instead asserted that Johns
291. ADMINSTRATION OF THE BAYH-DoLE Acr, supranote 2, at 4.
292. Exec. Order No. 12,591, 3 C.F.R. 220 (1988).

293. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f). Although our discussion of "reasonable terms" shows that

price is at least one decisive factor, Congress's decision to use the broader term seems to
contemplate other factors as well. These might include whether the product is available in

small and large quantities and any other terms considered subject to reasonability constraints.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, 978 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1997).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 191-92.
See CELLPRO DETERMINATION, supranote 237.
Id.
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Hopkins had "failed to take reasonable steps to commercialize the
technology.9299 This was probably sloppiness on the part of the NIH,
because its determination explores in depth--although ineffectually
and mistakenly-whether "practical application" was in fact
achieved. °° In the end, the NIH rejected CellPro's petition, but it did
so based on a misreading of the applicable statute and regulation.'O°
In its determination, the NIH found that Johns Hopkins had
"clearly met" the requirement for practical application. 2 The NIH
found that Johns Hopkins and its licensees had sold the invention
"worldwide," that machines incorporating the patent had been
installed in many medical centers, and that Johns Hopkins and its
licensees (namely Becton-Dickinson and Baxter Healthcare
Corporation) had "aggressively defended [their] patents in court. 30 3
The NIH determination concluded that these steps evidenced that the
patent owners had taken effective measures to achieve practical
application. 304 Additionally, the NIH found that Johns Hopkins'
licensing and Baxter's manufacture, practice, and operation of the
its availability to and use by the
patented technology demonstrated 305
law.
by
required
extent
the
to
public
However, the NIH's determination was clearly wrong. The NIH
treated "practical application" as if it merely required licensing,
manufacture, practice, operation, availability, and use; however, these
conditions are not enough. 6 In fact, these actions merely constitute
working the patent, a standard Congress rejected as a minimal trigger
for march-in rights under the Bayh-Dole Act.3 7 Instead, the BayhDole Act adopted a more stringent standard. A patent must be worked
and made "available to the public on reasonable terms."30 8 Among
other things, the NIH completely failed to determine whether Johns
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

306. The statute is clear. Mere availability is insufficient. The statute requires
availability on "reasonable terms." 35 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1994).
307. The language of the statute suffices to demonstrate that merely working the

patent is insufficient. See id. However, the statutory history shows even more clearly that,
although industry would have preferred simple availability, Congress rejected that standard.
1979 Senate Sel Hearings, supra note 46, at 221 (statement of Peter F. McCloskey)

(suggesting that it should be sufficient that an invention "is being worked or that its benefits
are available to the public on reasonable terms or through reasonable licensing arrangements"
(emphasis added)).
308. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f).
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Hopkins and its licensees demanded reasonable tenns.0 9 This
conclusion is not surprising because the NIH determination began with
a mischaracterization of CellPro's position as claiming that Johns
Hopkins did not "commercialize" the invention, when the statute does
not address "commercialization."
The statute addresses the
reasonableness
of the terms of commercialization-not
commercialization by itself.310 The NIH, in other words, confused
"practical application," which requires working and reasonable terms,
with a simple working or utilization requirement.
The NIH's determination not only flies in the face of the
legislative history, it is also flatly inconsistent with the language of the
Act itself, the "policy and objective" of which are explained in the
Act's introductory paragraph. 31 ' That language explains that the Act
intends to "protect the public against nonuse or unreasonableuse of
inventions."' Therefore it is crystal clear that simple utilization is not
sufficient to justify continued title under the Bayh-Dole Act. Such
utilization must be reasonable and, as later sections of the Act make
clear, reasonable use means achieving "practical application," which
'1 3
entails reasonable price terms.
Unfortunately, not only has the NIH determination failed,
resisted, or refused to understand and apply march-in rights
appropriately. The published commentary on the determination also
fails to grasp the legal issues involved. In Patents, Products, and
Public Health: An Analysis of the CellPro March-In Petition, the
authors conflate "practical application" with simple commercialization
or utilization. 314 In praising march-in rights, the authors conclude:
Despite economic incentives to license, there are times when march-in
may be necessary ....For example, a company may exclusively
license certain patents primarily to raise capital or to block competitors.
If the patent owner has licensed without milestones and benchmarks, it
loses the ability to address problems of public availability of the
technology... Because march-in authority is such a blunt and
powerful means to ensure that a government-funded technology does
not languish to the detriment of the public, it exerts an in terrorem
effect on the conduct of funding recipients and exclusive licensees....
Thus, exclusive licensees are encouraged by the presence of the march309. See CELLPRo DETERMINATION, supranote 237.
310. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f).
311. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West 1984 & Supp. 2000).
312. Id. (emphasis added).
313. 35 U.S.C. § 201(f).
314. See Barbara M. McGarey & Annette C. Levey, Patents, Products,and Public
Health: An Analysis ofthe CellProMarch-InPetition, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1095 (1999).
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or sublicense a technology, both of which
in authority to develop
315
public.
the
benefit
But the Bayh-Dole Act is not simply about "public availability,"
avoiding "languishing," or simple "development." It requires more
than that. The Act requires the contractor to ensure that the public
investment is protected by assuring that the invention is sold at a fair
and reasonable price.316 An invention for which the public has already
paid the price of R&D must be available on reasonable terms.317
receives the
Otherwise, the public pays twice, and the contractor
8
avoid.
to
sought
Congress
"windfall profit" that
IX. THE NIH's ABDICATION OF OVERSIGHT
Increasing the NIH's access to grantee data would bolster its
position in its relationships with its grantees. The extent to which the
NIH is in a weak position in relation to its grantees, by virtue of its
lack of information, is illustrated below. A highly publicized
arrangement between the Scripps Research Institute (Scripps), a
biomedical research organization, and the Swiss-based Sandoz
Pharmaceutical Corporation illustrates the NIH's sometimes-lax
oversight of its funding arrangements and, at the same time, raises
serious concerns over returns on taxpayer investment.3 9
Scripps' dealings with Sandoz created a stir after the two
institutions signed a ten-year contract under which Scripps was slated
to receive $30 million a year over the life of the agreement in
exchange for first option on exclusive licenses by Sandoz to virtually
all of Scripps' inventions.320 The proposed agreement provided
Sandoz representation on Scripps' board, the right to review Scripps'
invention disclosure reports before they were submitted to the NIH,
and the right to move research from Scripps to Sandoz anywhere in the
world.32 ' Because Scripps was expected to receive around $700
315. Id. at 1ll3.
316. See supranotes 175-227 and accompanying text (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act's
legislative history).
317. See supranotes 175-227 and accompanying text.
318. See supranotes 175-227 and accompanying text.
319. See UnderreportingFederalInvolvement, supra note 105, at 5-7 (testimony of
Michael R. Hill, Assistant Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) (noting
"fundamental problems with... NIH oversight").
320. Philip J. Hilts, Health ChiefAssailsDealBetween U.S. Research Lab and Swiss
Company, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A16; see also 1993 Conflict of Interest Hearing,
supra note 254, at 7-14 (1993) (testimony of Bernadine Healy, Dir., Nat'l Insts. of Health)
(criticizing the Scripps-Sandoz deal).
321. NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PANEL REPORT OF THE FORUM ON SPONSORED
RESEARCHAGREEMENTS: PERSpEmrEs, OutLOOK, AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 9 (1994).
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million in public funding from the NIH over the ten-year contract
period, many viewed this agreement as a public subsidy to a foreign
corporation that would facilitate the export of American technology
and impose serious constraints on the flow of scientific knowledge. 22
Because of the public controversy surrounding the contract, it was
renegotiated so that Sandoz would pay $20 million, rather than $30
million, per
year, in exchange for first-refusal rights to 47% of Scripps'
23
research.
While the Scripps-Sandoz deal may not have violated the letter of
the Bayh-Dole Act, it was clearly contrary to its spirit. One of the
statute's main objectives, "to promote the commercialization and
public availability of inventions made in the United States by United
States industry and labor," was virtually ignored.324 In addition, the
law was enacted to encourage small business firms to participate in
federally supported R&D efforts. 325
Although the codifying
regulations state that Congress did not intend to prevent nonprofit
organizations from providing big firms with invention options,326 the
Act was not intended to be a subsidy to large firms that are presumably
well equipped to compete in the marketplace. 27 However, the Act
contains no means of enforcing the small business or domestic
preferences, and the Scripps-Sandoz deal shows that contractors are
willing to ignore them. 28 What is probably worse, however, is that
this arrangement provides another layer of non-Bayh-Dole
contractors
329
discovery.
from
patents
Bayh-Dole
to shield
Following the controversy over the Scripps-Sandoz deal, the
Office of the Investigator General reviewed the 125 patents that
Scripps had filed with the Patent and Trademark Office and found that
330
only fifty-one, or 41%, acknowledged U.S government support.
The Investigator General believed that many of the remaining seventyfour grants may have been supported with NIH funds.3 Scripps
322. See 1993 Conflict of Interest Hearing,supra note 254, at 14 (testimony of
Bernadine Healy).
323. Tim Beardsley, Big-Time Biology, Sci. AM., Nov. 1994, at 90, 91-92.
324. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1994).
325. Id.

326. 37 C.F.R § 401.7 (2000).
327. The Act explicitly supports small business patent interests. See 35 U.S.C. § 200.
328. See 1993 Conflict of Interest Hearing,supra note 254, at 6-14 (testimony of
Bernadine Healy) (criticizing the Scripps-Sandoz deal and commenting on the absence of a
strong Bayh-Dole enforcement mechanism).
329. See supranotes 267-293 and accompanying text.
330. UnderreportingFederalInvolvement, supranote 105, at 2 (opening statement of
Hon. Ron Wyden).
331. Id.at26-28.
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initially claimed it was obliged to give the government credit only if
federal funds had been directly linked to a patent claim, but the Act
clearly defines "subject invention!' more broadly.332 Ultimately,
Scripps submitted a revised list to the NIH that acknowledged
government support for ninety-four, or 75%, of the 125 patents.333
Scripps characterized its failure to include the Bayh-Dole legend
on the additional forty-three patents as an unintentional error from
which it derived no benefits. 34 While Scripps admits it may have
erred, the company claims that the government was not harmed
because the government was still able to practice the inventions.335 In
an odd bit of false magnanimity, Scripps also said that the NIH did not
have to pay it a royalty, even though the agency was not named on the
patent legend.336 In fact, this royalty waiver is automatic because the
Bayh-Dole Act explicitly protects the government's worldwide right to
practice subject inventions free ofroyalties.337
To determine whether the Scripps-Sandoz case was an aberration
or indicative of a pattern, the Investigator General and the NIH staff
examined the patent policies of the top twenty-five patent-generating
universities.338
This study compared the number of patents
acknowledging federal support filed by these universities to the total
number of patents they filed.339 Of the more than 4500 patents
reviewed, only 37% contained the government rights clause,34 0 which
is quite similar to the false rate (41%) initially reported by Scripps.
The NIH concluded, "Some
of these proportions appear low in light of
3' 41
the total Federal funding.
In another study, the Investigator General also found deficiencies
in the NIl's oversight procedures, partly because of inadequate
agency staffing. 342 The NIH's Division of Extramural Invention
Reports has just two people to handle thousands of funding

332. Id. at 70 (report of June Gibbs Brown, Inspector Gen., Dep't of Health & Human

Sews.).

333. Id. at 2 (opening statement of Hon. Ron Wyden).
334. Id. at 113-14 (statement of Dr. William H. Beers, Senior Vice President, Scripps
Research Inst. and Douglas A. Bingham, Gen. Counsel, Scripps Research Inst.).
335. Id. at 20-21 (testimony of Dr. William H. Beers).
336. Id.
337. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (1994).
338. UnderreportingFederalInvolvement, supranote 105, at 7 (testimony of Michael

R. Hill).
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 104 (statement of Wendy Baldwin).
342. NIH OVERSIG-T OFEXTRAMURALREsEARCH, supranote 269, at 12.
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agreements yearly.343 This study determined that the NIH limits its
oversight of the U.S. industry preference; only 20% of the 100
universities surveyed have established U.S. manufacturing clauses in
their agreements.3" It also found that the NIH did not emphasize the
small business preference expressed in the Bayh-Dole Act and
provided only limited oversight to ensure that royalties were shared
with inventors and that excess income was distributed for research and
education purposes.34 The NIH has claimed that inventors themselves
will enforce these provisions.346
The NIH requires inventors to make, in writing, disclosure of
inventions and of the election to retain title, as well as annual reports
347
on utilization of research, patent applications, and patents.
However, the NIH does not review invention disclosures or title
elections for timeliness.34' Nor does it examine annual utilization
reports to monitor commercialization efforts, an oversight that
effectively limits the government's opportunity to take advantage of
march-in rights. 349 Further, no penalties have ever been levied against
grantees who submit patent applications for inventions that were never
disclosed or for which rights were never elected.350
The Investigator General recommended that the NIH develop
procedures to secure information directly from the Patent and
Trademark Office.35 ' In congressional hearings on this issue,
Representative Ron Wyden termed this recommendation
"underwhelming" in light of the approximately $8 billion that the
government pays for research through the NIH .352 He stated that the
NIH was overly reliant on "grantees voluntarily doing the right
thing."353 If the NIH continued not to oversee its technology transfer
arrangements, he proposed either that an outside contractor be 3hired
or
54
that the Department of Commerce be assigned to enforcement.
The NIH responded to the Investigator General's suggestion of
greater oversight by pointing out that other agencies do not conduct
343. Id. at 3.
344. Id. at ll.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 12.

347. Id.
348. Id.
349.
350.
351.
R. Hill).
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
UnderreportingFederalInvolvement,supra note 105, at 8 (testimony of Michael
Id. at 53 (opening statement of Hon. Ron Wyden).
Id.
Id.
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case-by-case oversight as recommended by the Inspector General's
report

s5

The Public Health Service's (PHS) reply that this would

entail too much work certainly does not seem to be a sufficient
reason.3 56 The NIH's adoption of an electronic database system
(EDISON) designed to track inventions did not resolve the problem as
apparently had been hoped. Largely, this was because EDISON, too,
relied upon self-reporting by contractors for its accuracy and
comprehensiveness.3 7 The GAO has reported that this simply does

not work.358

The situation seems essentially unchanged today.

The most

recent report of the GAO indicates that Bayh-Dole compliance is
unmonitored and can be fairly characterized as out of control.359 In
fact, the matter seems now to be even more complicated by
interagency jealousies. The GAO report included findings of an NIH
draft report in its conclusions, to which the NIH objected.360 However,
the GAO proceeded to publish61 its report intact and without the

deletions demanded by the NIH"

It is not surprising that these kinds of stories recur. What is
disturbing is their misconceived fatalism. Last year, it was revealed
355. Id. at 101 (statement of Wendy Baldwin).
356. Id. at 80 (memorandum of Philip R. Lee, M.D., Assistant Sec'y for Health, Dep't
of Health & Human Servs.) ("Implementation of a process like that just described would
result in an enormous burden ....).
357. See REPORTNG RFQuEmES, supranote 271, at 12-14.
358. According to the GAO, information on compliance with the Bayh-Dole Act was
either not available or highly inaccessible: "Neither the Government Register nor the patent
database is a sufficient source for determining the rights the government possesses to
federally sponsored inventions. Besides being inaccurate, incomplete, and inconsistent, the
databases can be difficult to use." Id. at 13.
359. The Report described the background in this way:
Prior to 1980, the government generally retained title to any inventions created
under federal research grants and contracts, although the specific policies varied
among the agencies. Increasingly, however, this situation had become a source of
dissatisfaction. One reason was a general belief that the results of governmentowned research were not being made available to those who could use them.
Id. at 2. The Report summarized its findings as follows:
Federal agencies and their contractors and grantees are not complying with
provisions on the disclosure, reporting, retention, and licensing of federally
sponsored inventions under the regulations implementing the Bayh-Dole Act and
Executive Order 12591. In our review of more than 2,000 patents issued in
calendar year 1997 as well as an Inspector General's draft report on 12 large
grantees of the National Institutes of Health, we found that the databases for
recording the government's royalty-free licenses are inaccurate, incomplete, and
inconsistent and that some inventions are not being recorded at all.
Id.
360. Id. at20-21.
361. Id.
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that the government is investigating activity at the California Institute
of Technology (Caltech) related to the acquisition of important DNArelated patents by private industry.362 Whether the invention was
federally funded, when it was conceived, and whether the Bayh-Dole
legend should be on the patent are key issues. However, no one is
discussing what should be the central consequence of all this: whether
the price can be regulated.363
A similar story surfaced recently describing the governmentfunded research and development of Xalatan, a best-selling eyedrop
for glaucoma. The New York Times described the commercial success
of the drug as follows: "With $507 million in sales last year-and the
potential for billions more, most of it pure profit-the four-year-old
medicine is the equivalent of liquid gold for its manufacturer, the
Pharmacia Corporation. The eyedrop [also] earned Columbia
University about $20 million in royalties last year ... ."' The public
debate is dominated, however, not by accusations that manufacturers
are evading existing price controls but, instead, by the repeated
misconception that no such price controls exist."
The NIH's lax oversight and its reluctance to enforce the marchin provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act, though regrettable, do not have
any easy legal remedy. Whether there is any private remedy to enforce
march-in rights is, at best, questionable. There is case law indicating
that if agency inaction is based solely on its mistaken belief that it
lacks jurisdiction, or on a policy that is so extreme as to be an
abdication of its responsibilities, then a legal remedy may be
available. 66 The NIH's jurisdictional misbeliefs and weak monitoring
362. Gosselin & Jacobs, supranote 20.

363. Id. In response to government inquiries, Caltech claimed that the invention at
issue was developed prior to the acquisition of a particular funding request. There was a
working prototype sequencer, it claimed, in March 1985, six months before Caltech received
the federal money. What Caltech did not say is whether there were any other funding grants

prior to the invention during which it may have been conceived. Id.
364. See Gerth & Stolberg, supranote 20.
365. The New York Times article contains a fatalistic (and erroneous) regret of a former
NIH head: "As Dr. Bernadine Healy, a former director of the National Institutes of Health,
said in a recent interview, 'We sold away government research so cheap."' Id.
366. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). The Administrative Procedure
Act governs whether agency decisions, including decisions not to enforce a statute, are
judicially reviewable. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994). Section 702 allows any person
"adversely affected or aggrieved" to challenge agency action, including failure to act, as long

as such a challenge is not barred by statute or unless the matter is committed by law to the
discretion of the agency. Id. § 701(a). The HecklerCourt held that failure to enforce a statute
is presumptively discretionary and therefore unreviewable. 470 U.S. at 837-38. On the other
hand, the Court noted that this is only a presumption that can be rebutted "where the
substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its
enforcement powers." Id. at 832-33. In the case of the Bayh-Dole Act, an argument
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procedures lead to its nonenforcement of march-in rights, but do not
necessarily supply the basis for judicial review.367
Thus it is not clear, especially from the legislative history, that
individuals or third parties have any enforceable claims over the BayhDole Act's reasonable pricing provision. Standing could be difficult to
show. Proving causation may also be difficult without the disclosure
of privileged data from industry.3 68 Though the NIH's position-that
the public benefits from technology transfers through a better
economy, more jobs, and the privilege of being able to buy the product
in the marketplace without regard to the product's price-is

questionable,369 it is not clear that a private remedy is available. And

(unsuccessful in the cases cited in the following footnote) can be made that the detailed
clauses appearing in § 202 of the Act amount to the kind of guidelines that should render
agencies' actions reviewable. In any event, the Heckler Court was careful to note that a
failure to enforce because of an agency's mistaken "belief that it lacks jurisdiction" or "that
the agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities... might indicate that such decisions
were not 'committed to agency discretion."' Id. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
367. Unfortunately, several courts have already refused to enforce various provisions
of the Bayh-Dole Act, although none of them have attempted to enforce the policing of
publicly funded inventions, nor have any of them claimed the public right to "reasonable"
prices, which the Bayh-Dole Act seems to guarantee. See S. Research Inst. v. Griffin Corp.,
938 F.2d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 1991); Gen-Probe Inc. v. Ctr. for Neurologic Study, 853 F.
Supp. 1215 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804 F. Supp. 614,629 (D.N.J.
1992); Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360,365 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). All of these cases involved claims by companies to rival companies' patent rights, a
type of claim that courts might easily consider either committed to agency discretion or
unintended by Congress. These types of claims, however, seem far different than demands
by medical patients to have necessary drugs available to them on the reasonable terms
commanded by the Bayh-Dole Act. In terms of law, these potential plaintiffs would have the
kind of concrete claim expressly contemplated by Congress, the absence of which arguably
distinguishes all of the above-cited cases.
368. Former NIH head Bernadine Healy's statement that prices cannot be controlled
because of the legal inability to procure confidential financial information is, in addition to
being politically arguable, simply naive from a legal standpoint. NIHNot Equipped,supra
note 245. Financial information that is otherwise deemed confidential is routinely available
to litigants under state and federal rules of civil procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for example, provide for "protective orders" so that confidential information that
is disclosed to adverse litigants will not be communicated to third parties. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c). When private companies enter into relationships with the government, they are held to
waive their rights to confidential information to the extent that information is necessary to
ensure compliance with federal policies. CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (determining whether a company that contracted with the federal government must
disclose confidential hiring information under the Freedom of Information Act). Bayh-Dole
contractors, by virtue of their agreement to standard government patent clauses, are, legally
speaking, indistinguishable from other kinds of government contractors.
369. The HHS, the PHS, and the NIH have published a kind of Bayh-Dole manifesto
committing themselves to a partnership between public monies and private industry and
emphasizing technology transfer without ever mentioning any express need to police prices
as Bayh-Dole requires:
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even if judicial review could force march-in, it would be difficult to
achieve because of the sixty-day limitation placed on these ights.
Whether the sixty-day period would itself be vulnerable to challenge
as an extreme abdication of agency obligations is itself a large

question.
X.

CONCLUSION

The existing, all-too-frequently unacknowledged, and utterly
unenforced price controls of the Bayh-Dole Act have potential
significance because they appear to apply to a large number of
important drugs. Because the Bayh-Dole Act only applies to
inventions that are at least partially federally funded, the key question
is how many drugs result from such federal assistance. It appears that

a large proportion of all new patents, and a larger percentage of new

pharmaceuticals,37 derive in one way or another from federal funding.
Analyses of U.S.-granted patents that cited research papers
suggests that the linkage between patents and public research was

Both the public and private sectors must work together to foster rapid development
and commercialization of useful products to benefit human health, stimulate the
economy, and enhance our international competitiveness, while at the same time
protecting taxpayers' investment and safeguarding the principles of scientific
integrity and academic freedom...
Recipients are required to maximize the use of their research findings ...
through their timely and effective transfer to industry for development.
Developing Sponsored Research Agreements: Considerations for Recipients of NIH
Research Grants and Contracts, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,673, 55,673-75 (Nov. 8, 1994). The policy
further states that
[t]he Act serves the public not only by encouraging the development of useful
commercial products such as drugs and clinical diagnostic materials, but also by
providing economic benefits, and enhancing U.S. competitiveness in the global
market place.
Since its passage, the Bayh-Dole Act has been effective in promoting the
transfer of technology from Recipients to industry as evidenced by the aggressive
pursuit of patenting and licensing and the proliferation of university/industry
collaborations....
In keeping with the objectives and policies of Bayh-Dole, it is incumbent
upon Recipients to effectively and efficiently transfer technology to industry for
commercial development.
Id. at 55,675-76.
370. As the National Science Foundation noted: "Te linkage [between patents and
public research] is particularly evident in patents for 'drugs and medicines.' Applications in
this category cited, on average, several times the number of research papers cited, for
example, in the category of 'communication equipment and electronic components."' NAT'L
Sc. FOUND., INDUSmY TRENDS INRESEARCH SUPPORT AND LmnKs TO PuBLIc RESEARCH 2
(1999). The figure for pharmaceuticals is 50%. Id. at 4.
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growing at a steady rate across five major industrialized nations. 7 '
"This was particularly true for the half of U.S. patents granted to U.S.
'
inventors."372
These American inventors "overwhelmingly cited U.S.authored research papers, two-thirds of which were published by
organizations primarily supported by public funding.""37
More importantly, available information indicates that not only
do many drugs benefit from federal funding, but the most important,
so-called blockbuster drugs owe most of their development to federal
funding.374 As a result, the Bayh-Dole Act is as much a potential
blockbuster, given the political will, in terms of controlling health care
costs, as are the drugs its price-control mechanism embraces. Given
the political will, the government might even decide to exercise other
portions of the Act, such as its royalty-free right to produce these drugs
371. Id. at 2.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. The available data indicate that federally funded drugs constitute the majority of
truly effective drugs. While the FDA approves hundreds of drugs for marketing every year,
the number of new or important drugs is relatively small. In testimony before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, one witness illustrated the federal government's role in
supporting innovative drug development:
During [the] 5 year period [from 1987-1991] the FDA issued 2,270 drug
approvals, but most were for generic drugs or new combinations of existing
compounds. Only 117 of the new drug approvals involved so called "New
Molecular Entities" (NMEs), which is the name given to drugs which are distinctly
different in composition from drugs already on the market. Of these 117 NMEs,
only 30 were judged by the FDA to be drugs that were used in the treatment of
several illnesses (FDA class E or AA drugs) or to represent a substantial gain in
therapeutic value (FDA efficacy rating of A).
Of these 30 "important new drugs" approved by the FDA, 15 benefited from
significant funding by the U.S. government. When one considers the country
where the drug was discovered the government's role is even more important. 17
of the "important" new drugs were discovered in the U.S. Of these drugs, 12 were
developed with significant government funding-that is, 71 percent were
developed with significant government funding.
1994 Drug PricingHearing,supra note 6, at 71-72 (statement of James P. Love, Dir. of
Econ. Studies, Ctr. for Study of Responsive Law).
Of the eighty-four anticancer drugs receiving FDA approval as of January 1, 1997, fiftyfour were the product of federal funding. CTEP, FDA APPROVED ANTI-CANCER DRUGS, at
http://ctep.info.nih.gov/handbook/handbook/fda._agen.htm (ast modified Jan. 27, 1999). In
April 2000, the University of Rochester was awarded a broad biotech patent covering an
entire class of drugs known as "cox-2 inhibitors." Harry Schwartz, PatentLawyers,Prepare:
A Cox-2 Patent Awarded to the University of Rochester Years Afler Filing Raises
Fundamental Questions About the Future of the Entire US. Patent Protection System,
PHARM¢EtmCAm
ExacuIvF, June 2000, at 18. The press release from the University said
the patent is likely to be "the most lucrative pharmaceutical patent in U.S. history." The U.S.
patent (No. 6,048,850) bears the Bayh-Dole legend. Rochester has sued Searle and Pfizer
over the sale of Celebrex, which they say infringes on the patent, and the University says it
will have broad application in many other areas of medicine, including cancer and
Alzheimer's disease. Id.
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at cost (or less) for the Medicare program. 75 But political will, of
course, cannot be supplied by statute.

375. See supranote 337 and accompanying text.
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